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Part I 
Introduction: The Importance of Informality 
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 Consider, for a moment, the difficulty faced by the owner of a small 
tailoring shop in Cusco, Peru.  The high level of competition forces her to lower 
prices every week in order to attract new customers.  Unfortunately, the costs of 
running a business are not decreasing.  Filing taxes is a long and arduous process,1 
while a complicated regulatory structure serves to further increase the costs of 
conducting business (Heritage Foundation, 2008; World Bank Group, 2008).  
After a few months of low profits, this business owner makes the difficult 
decision to enter the informal sector, going through the lengthy process of closing 
her business.  She is officially unemployed, but loyal customers know where to 
find her.  She is able to continue production without the nuisance of taxes or 
regulation.  With this change, the Peruvian tailor has entered the informal sector.  
According to a typology discussed in further detail later, these actions place the 
Peruvian tailor in the category of evasive informal activity.  By leaving the formal 
economy as a response to high taxes and regulatory burdens her actions clear.   
 In contrast, consider a Peruvian tailor who is unsure of her ability to attract 
enough customers and remain solvent.  She starts out by doing work for family 
and friends, relying on word of mouth to bring in new business.  After building a 
sufficient customer base, she makes the leap to formal business, registering with 
the government and beginning to pay taxes on her earnings.  This individual has 
                                                 
1
 The World Bank estimates that a medium business spends an average of four hundred and twenty 
four hours annually complying with tax regulations.  This is one hundred hours more than the time 
for United States businesses of the same size (Heritage Foundation, 2008). 
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made the opposite transition, using the informal sector as a launching ground for a 
formal business and placing herself in the start-up category of informal activity.2  
From these two simple examples it is obvious that the informal economy is 
comprised of multiple individuals performing a variety of activities, a problem 
which has plagued previous research of the sector.  This observation asks 
researchers to consider whether informality poses a problem large enough to 
matter and, if so, in what ways it affects an individual country’s economy. 
 In over eighty countries worldwide, the informal economy comprises at 
least one third of the official GDP (Schneider, 2007).  The implications of these 
numbers are even more staggering considering that this large portion of the GDP 
is, by definition, not taxed or regulated by the country’s government.  The 
resultant loss in potential tax revenue is huge, especially for developing countries 
whose governments are already strained to provide basic services.3  In addition to 
the economic impact, informal activity is associated with risky operating 
procedures as these businesses avoid most all types of government regulation, 
including health standards for workers, and tend to engage in environmentally 
irresponsible behavior for which those in charge are generally not held 
                                                 
2
 This anecdote is based on interviews conducted of small business owner is Cusco, Peru during 
the summer of 2007.  Though these stories do not mirror that of any specific individual, they 
reflect the general sentiments and situation of many.  
 
3
 This paper is by no means suggesting that formalizing the informal economy will lead to a more 
effective government.  As is widely documented in the literature, corruption, distorted incentives, 
and many other problems face the governments of developing countries, all of which are problems 
that increased revenue will not alter (Easterly, 2001; van de Walle, 2001). 
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accountable (Forastieri, 1999).  For an activity of such significance to so many 
countries, surprisingly little is known about the root causes and long-term effects 
of the informal sector. 4  Though typical explanations of informality (high taxes, 
over-regulation, and high levels of corruption) tend to suggest that those 
participating in the sector choose to hide their activities from the state for the sake 
of convenience, an increasing number of studies suggest otherwise (Bajada & 
Schneider, 2005b; Dreher & Schneider, 2006; Williams & Round, 2007; Ypeij, 
2000). 
 While the issue of informality is particularly salient to developing nations 
as they tend to have much larger informal sectors than their developed 
counterparts, that it is also of concern to many developed nations demonstrates 
the truly global nature of this dilemma ((Bajada & Schneider, 2005b).  The 
problems associated with informality are well documented.  The issue of lower 
tax revenue is intuitive, but there are other concerns to be addressed.  As informal 
businesses and their employees are often not included in the calculation of 
national statistics used to gauge the health of a country’s economy, a large amount 
of informal activity can result in highly biased statistics.  For example, individuals 
                                                 
4
 Though there is a debate as to whether or not the term informal sector should be used (see KILM, 
2007), this paper will utilize the terms informal economy and informal sector interchangeably.  
This practice is commonly accepted by many scholars (Rakowski, 1994b).  Other academics have 
proposed that the terms underground economy, shadow economy, black economy, parallel 
economy, invisible economy, and others may also be used (Humphreys, 1985; Schneider & Enste, 
2002).  
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working in the informal economy may be included in the estimates of a country’s 
unemployment rate (Bajada & Schneider, 2005a; Hyun & Yoo, 1999; Tanzi, 
1999).  These distortions have become a particular concern in the European Union 
as the community seeks to expand membership to nations with particularly large 
informal sectors, biasing the very statistics used to judge their candidacy (Enste, 
2005; Tanzi, 1999).  Finally, as informal economic activities do not comply with 
regulations, there is a high probability that many of the goods produced and 
services provided by this sector will not comply with acceptable health and safety 
standards, leading to additional problems for the government to address (Bajada 
& Schneider, 2005a).   
 However, the effects of informality are not all bad.  Recent studies suggest 
that this sector may have a positive effect on a country’s growth rates or even help 
to reduce poverty (Kim, 2005; Ypeij, 2000).  As the informal economy often 
employs those who are relatively poor within a given society, it has been 
suggested that this sector acts as a de facto manner of redistributing income, since 
individuals who are formally employed are, via taxes, paying for the public goods 
provided by the country’s government (Ypeij, 2000).  A 2005 study even found 
that, in relatively impoverished areas, participation in the informal economy is 
linked with increased community engagement, an activity that most governments 
want to encourage (Williams, 2005b).  The competing effects of informal activity 
make the adoption of effective policies even more difficult.  Should governments 
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work to fight the informal sector or support it?  These issues combined with the 
many other problems faced by developing nations as they confront periods of 
stalled growth have confirmed that further exploration of the concept must be an 
essential component of future development plans (Bajada & Schneider, 2005b; 
Loayza, 1996).  In order to fully comprehend how the informal economy is 
affected by different policies, a better understanding of its root causes is 
necessary.  Beyond the typical explanations of taxes, regulations, and corruption, 
what factors lead to high levels of informal economic activity?  How does this 
activity affect other aspects of a country’s development, specifically economic 
growth?     In the following introduction I will discuss which definition of the 
informal economy is used in this work, give a basic outline of past thought on the 
field, and provide a brief summary of the theoretical grounding, describing the 
expected relationships between tested variables.  A brief description of the tests 
conducted will be followed by the results of these tests and a short outline of the 
paper’s layout. 
What is the Informal Economy? 
 Though there is a wide variety of literature dedicated to understanding the 
informal economy, a universally accepted definition for the concept has yet to 
emerge.  The informal economy has been defined based on many different 
criteria.  Some researchers focus on the number of, or relationship between, 
people involved in an individual business, while others maintain that it is the 
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relative size of the business, or its relationship with other entities – such as large 
corporations or the government –  that identify informal businesses (International 
Labour Organization, 2002; Roberts, 1990; Ypeij, 2000; Schneider, 2007).  In 
short, the informal economy can refer to a wide range of activities that produce a 
myriad of products.  The International Labor Organization (ILO) attempted to 
remedy this problem in 1993 by establishing an official definition for the term.  
However, this definition was not adopted on a universal level, and the problem 
remains as individual states continue to define the concept and calculate measures 
in slightly different ways (International Labour Organization, 1993; KILM, 2007).   
 Given this confusion, it is essential to state the exact definition to be used 
in any study of informality.  This paper will follow the example set by Friedrich 
Schneider, defining the informal economy to include those businesses which 
conceal their activity from the government and other regulatory agencies, despite 
the fact that the goods and services they produce are perfectly legal.  In other 
words, those goods which would be included in a country’s GDP statistics and 
taxed were they reported to the proper authorities.  This definition purposefully 
excludes all criminal activity that is occasionally classified as informal, as well as 
unreported profits that do not relate to the production of goods and services (F. 
Schneider & Enste, 2002; F. Schneider & Bajada, 2005; F. Schneider, 2007).  
Excluding criminal activity is essential as its inclusion adds a new dimension to 
research on the topic which is counterproductive to the goals of this particular 
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study.  With a focus on those businesses whose informality is affecting the 
government via reduced tax base and distorting national statistics, the inclusion of 
criminal activity would be ineffective as these activities would not be included in 
GDP calculations if they were discovered by authorities.      
Concept of the Informal Economy Emerges 
 An understanding of how the concept and theories of the informal 
economy evolved allows for easier comprehension of the debate.  In the 1950’s 
and 1960’s, many described what is now referred to as the informal economy (the 
term had yet to be coined) as backward and detrimental to a country’s 
development.  Often dubbed the “traditional” sector, small-scale economic 
activity, such as shoe shining or selling goods on the street, was seen as the 
temporary response to a shortage of job opportunities brought on by mass urban 
migration and high rates of population growth, a problem that could easily be 
resolved with foreign investment and the development of a “modern” industrial 
sector (International Labour Organization, 1972; International Labour 
Organization, 2002; Moser, 1994).  However, this perception of informality came 
under question as researchers began to conduct increasingly in-depth studies.   For 
example, an ILO report during this period called for the creation of five million 
new jobs in Colombia so as to rid the country of its “traditional” economy.  The 
impractical nature of this recommendation caused many to question portrayals of 
the informal economy as a simple nuisance left over from those areas of society 
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that had yet to accept capitalism (International Labour Organization, 2002; Moser, 
1994).  Though supporters of the traditional/modern view continued to push 
economic modernization, many scholars began to look for new explanations 
(International Labour Organization, 2002). 
 In the late sixties, Keith Hart coined the term “informality” in an 
innovative study which presented this sector of the economy as relevant and 
possibly necessary to a country’s development (Hart, 1973; International Labour 
Organization, 2002).  In his analysis of Ghanaian informality, Hart equated the 
concept with being self-employed.  He went on to describe the important role 
played by this activity in providing an income for people between jobs, focusing 
on case studies of citizens who switched back-and-forth between formal and 
informal employment.  Suggesting that this sector of the economy could be 
viewed either as an impediment to growth, trapping people in a cycle of poverty, 
or a precursor to growth, providing entrepreneurs the opportunity to launch a 
successful business, Hart noted that more research needed to be done in order to 
discern the sector’s full effects (Hart, 1973).  Much of the research conducted 
since Hart published his study attempts to classify the informal economy’s effect 
on a country’s development.   
 The ILO followed Hart’s study of Ghana with one in Kenya, designed to 
better understand that country’s high unemployment figures.  This research on 
unemployment focused on the dichotomy between formal and informal 
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enterprises, concluding the Kenyan government needed to encourage more 
informal-type employment instead of restricting it.  This, they argued, would 
produce reductions in the unemployment rate.  The ILO researchers looked at 
individuals in several different types of informal jobs, from construction workers 
to female laborers, addressing the problem from multiple angles (Leys, 1973).  
Though this study produced several recommendations which have since been 
condemned as unrealistic, its contribution to the conception of informal activity 
has helped in expanding the definition to include individuals employed in 
multiple sectors (Leys, 1973).  In addition to broadening the concept of 
informality, the ILO supported Hart’s conjectures that the informal economy was 
not necessarily a hindrance to development, an idea which, controversial at the 
time, has since become a common approach to the study of informality 
(International Labour Organization, 2002).  
 In the late eighties Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto, along with the 
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), pushed the concept of informality 
further in an in-depth case study of the sector in Lima, Peru.  This book described 
informality as the rational response of Peru’s poor population given the country’s 
internal instability and high number of regulations for businesses to enter the 
market legally (Bromley, 1994).  De Soto emphasized the importance of the 
informal economy in the country’s day-to-day functioning, from providing public 
transportation to building houses.  He portrayed the Peruvian state as the main 
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problem, claiming that overregulation is the true source of informality.  To back 
this claim, De Soto tracked how long it would take for a small business to 
formalize in Peru.  His findings were astounding.  Nearly three hundred days at an 
extraordinarily high cost, the equivalent of nearly three years minimum wage 
earnings, was required to start a small business (De Soto, 1989).  De Soto’s study 
directed attention to the role that individual states play in influencing the size of 
the informal economy within their borders, and led the Peruvian government to 
enact several policies to reduce these barriers (Bromley, 1994).    
 Throughout the end of the 20th and into the 21st century, studies of the 
informal economy expanded to regularly include the developed as well as 
developing nations.  Much of this research has been particularly focused on 
European nations since entrance into the European Union has made computation 
of accurate statistics, something a large informal economy obscures, essential 
(Tanzi, 1999).  The resulting research, often in-depth case studies, tends to focus 
on the incentive structures within individual nations and proposes policy options 
aimed at reducing the size of the informal sector (Debrah, 2007; Williams, 2005a; 
Williams & Round, 2007; Ypeij, 2000).  In addition to studies of individual 
nations, researchers are beginning to focus on large-scale data collection in an 
attempt to correlate the informal economy with other variables and to test 
previous theories that government regulation is at the heart of the informal 
activity.  A few studies have begun to include other variables traditionally 
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associated with informality, such as corruption levels within a country (Dreher & 
Schneider, 2006; Schneider, 2007).   
Theoretical Grounding 
 The above-mentioned views each served an important role in 
conceptualizing the informal economy, identifying the practice, and connecting it 
to a country’s economic development.  As discussed in greater detail throughout 
the following section, the legalist perspective (based in the neo-liberal school of 
thought) combined with rational actor theory is utilized as a framework for this 
study.  Together these two views form rational legalist theory, which is discussed 
below and displayed in Figure 1.1.    
 Legalist theory views informality as an entrepreneur’s logical response to 
over-regulation by the state (Rakowski, 1994a).  Hernando De Soto’s research, in 
which he explored the vast bureaucratic system that Peruvian businesses had to 
navigate in order to formalize, is an early contributor to this school of thought (De 
Soto, 1989).  But legalist theory leaves many things to be explained.  It fails to 
consider that the costs entrepreneurs seek to avoid are not just monetary but 
include social, as well as opportunity, costs.  Relying on the rational actor theory 
allows for the inclusion of these additional costs.5  The rational legalist model 
argues that entrepreneurs consider all costs involved in entering the formal sector 
                                                 
5
   Rational actor theory states that before making any decision, rational actors will take into 
account every cost and benefit associated with that decision eventually choosing that option which 
provides them with the highest level of utility (Kraft & Furlong, 2007).   
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before deciding to undergo the process. As this includes the social and 
opportunity costs of formalizing, the main causes of the informal economy can no 
longer be restricted to the amount of taxes levied, regulations enforced, and 
corruption within a country.  Factors such as gender equality and education 
should also be considered and are expected to have negative relationships with the 
size of the informal economy.  Other variables, such as the amount of goods a 
country exports, are also expected to influence the individual’s decision and are 
predicted to have a positive relationship with informality.  This first stage of the 
rational legalist model is displayed as the first half of Figure 1.1 below. 
              The next step in the rational legalist model predicts the effect that 
informal activity will have on the economy’s overall growth.  The legalist view 
anticipates that removing the barriers which force businesses to evade government 
regulation will allow those in the informal sector to formalize and propel the 
country’s economic growth.  By not removing these barriers, growth is predicted 
to be stifled due to the lack of taxes collected and income reported (Rakowski, 
1994a; Ypeij, 1998).  This portion of legalist theory is carried over to the rational 
legalist model, which anticipates that economic policies conducive to 
formalization will increase the amount of start-up informal activity and lead to 
economic growth, while restrictive policies will increase evasive activity, stalling 
economic growth. 
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 Since rational choice theory is used as a base for rational legalist theory, 
there are a multitude of independent variables which could be included in this 
analysis.  The researcher need only provide strong theoretical support for why 
individuals would consider the factor relevant when deciding to enter the informal 
sector.  For this reason, the rational legalist model will always be open for further 
interpretation as new information surfaces about the sector.  With the assumption 
that individuals are rational actors, this study is able to include additional 
variables, aimed at measuring such factors as gender equality and education, 
alongside traditional explanations of informality.  These measures for gender 
equity, education, and government quality are all expected to have negative 
relationships with the informal economy while measures of taxes, regulations, 
Restrictive 
Conducive 
Economic 
 Growth 
Incentives and 
Constraints 
Figure 1.1: Rational Legalist View of 
Start Up 
Informal 
Economy 
Evasive 
Informal 
Economy 
Stalled 
Growth 
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corruption, exports and a poor age distribution within the population are all 
expected to have positive relationships with informality.    
The predicted relationships are tested using ordinary least squares 
regression techniques and first-differenced data from one hundred and twenty four 
countries in the years 2000 and 2005.  The exact specifications of this model are 
elaborated on in Part III.  Using the first differences model to correlate the 
changes in informal activity with changes in the predicted variable will provide a 
better idea of why the informal economy grows, helping to better understand the 
level of informality within a given country.  The second half of rational choice 
theory predicts that different types of informality affect a country’s growth in 
different ways.  This is tested by dividing countries into two groups – those with a 
conducive business environment and those with a restrictive environment.  After 
this division has been made, the relationship between the size of the country’s 
informal economy and its economic growth is tested.  This relationship is 
expected to be positive in countries with conducive policies and negative to non-
existent in countries with restrictive policies.     
The results of these tests, though occasionally surprising, tend to support 
the rational legalist model.  The measures of gender inequality and age 
distribution are both significant.  The measure used to approximate gender 
equality, female labor force participation rates, has the predicted positive 
relationship with the informal economy, while the country’s dependency ratios, 
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used to approximate age distribution, have a relationship exactly opposite that 
which was expected.  All else equal, a country with relatively more individuals of 
working age will have a larger informal economy.  Measures of education and 
government quality are on the borderline of significance, with both variables 
displaying relationships opposite those predicted.  Exports are found to be 
insignificant to a country’s informal economy.  Many factors considered key in 
legalist theory were found to be insignificant, such as the measures used to 
quantify tax burden, regulations, and corruption.  Given the literature supporting 
this relationship, these findings are likely a product of another issue; possibilities 
for this are discussed in Part IV.   
The second set of tests is much more supportive of the rational legalist 
model, finding that the relationship is as predicted.  Countries with conducive 
policies have informal economies which have a high, positive correlation with 
growth, indicating that a larger informal economy is correlated with higher 
growth in these countries.  However, countries with restrictive policies have a 
very weak correlation between the informal economy and economic growth.  
While this is not the negative relationship expected, it does indicate that there is a 
difference between these two types of formality, which is the ultimate goal of 
rational legalist theory.  
This study takes previous research one step further.  Though case studies 
often delve into the relationship between certain social indicators and 
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demographic factors within a given country, there has yet to be a large-scale 
comparison of these relationships across numerous countries, especially one that 
accounts for states at varied levels of development.  This research also provides a 
coherent logic for expecting a different relationship between a country’s informal 
economy and growth based on a set of factors other than its GDP. 
 The following chapter will explain the theoretical assumptions behind this 
study, discussing the definitional problems which have plagued studies of 
informality and justifying the need to adopt the rational legalist approach.  The 
third section identifies those variables identified as causes to the informal 
economy, addressing past research to support the assumptions made.  The 
measurements used to quantify these variables are also addressed, as is the 
fundamental problem of measuring a variable which, by its very definition, is 
something its participants try to hide.   The fourth and fifth sections provide an in-
depth analysis of the results mentioned previously, while the final chapter puts 
these findings in context with the big picture, addressing why this information is 
important and how it can be used in future research.   
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Part II 
Theory: Finding a Paradigm 
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 The following section provides an in-depth discussion of the theoretical 
grounding for this study.  The many conceptualizations of the informal economy 
mentioned in the introduction are described here in greater detail along with a 
detailed description of the specific definition to be utilized throughout this 
analysis.  The main theoretical frameworks dealing with informality are outlined, 
and a mix of the legalist perspective and rational choice theory is chosen as a 
guide.  A brief summary of past studies that have examined the informal economy 
provides support for the selection of these theories, followed by a detailed 
description of the model used in this study, rational legalist theory. 
  As previously mentioned, there is no universal conception of the informal 
economy. 
Though the International Labor Organization (ILO) officially defined the term in 
1993 during the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, there has 
yet to be a widespread adoption of this definition.  Taking into account various 
facets of the concept, this conference declared the informal economy as those 
“units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective 
of generating employment and income…. [They] typically operate at a low level 
of organization with little or no division between labor and capital…and on a 
small scale” (International Labour Organization, 1993, p.2).  A tendency to rely 
on “social relations rather than contractual arrangements” as well as to have the 
unit’s owner assume full liability for the business are other characteristics used to 
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identify those operating in the informal economy (International Labour 
Organization, 1993, p.2) .  For example, street vendors are a common type of 
informal business.  Street vendors are often self-employed and tend to rely on the 
profits of their day-to-day activity for survival.  The lack of a formal place to 
conduct business highlights both the small-scale nature of the work, as well as the 
difficulty inherent in capital acquisition.  Finally, street vendors tend to conduct 
business transactions, such as buying materials for their goods, from family or 
friends and their businesses are not legally established, so the individual remains 
liable for any problems that may arise.  Unfortunately, many nations never 
adopted this definition for their own purposes and continue to calculate statistics 
based on varied criteria.  This makes efforts to compile a universally comparable 
and valid dataset exceedingly difficult (KILM, 2007). Furthermore, the multiple 
debates among scholars concerning exactly what constitutes the informal 
economy ensure that the emergence of a universal definition is unlikely.        
 Developing a complete understanding of the scope of the informal 
economy requires knowing what the concept does not include.  Defining the 
informal economy through purely descriptive terms has been a practice used by 
many in order to conceptualize the term.  In this approach, many researchers 
focus on characteristics of the formal economy, claiming that entities with the 
opposite characteristics comprise the informal economy.  For example, businesses 
within the formal sector are viewed as providing stable employment while making 
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profits; therefore, those businesses providing irregular employment and making 
little to no profit are classified as informal.  Another common practice is to 
directly label those individuals below a certain income level or businesses smaller 
than a given size as members of the informal economy (PREALC, 1978, p. 22-3; 
Ypeij, 2000).  However, relying on a descriptive method to classify economic 
activity is problematic from a methodological standpoint as one could easily run 
into problems of classification.  For example, how does one determine the number 
of characteristics an activity would need to demonstrate before being classified as 
formal?  With this in mind, it is obvious that the informal economy needs its own 
definition rather than one which simply defines it as the opposite of another 
vaguely defined concept.  While this is an intuitive way to conceptualize the 
informal economy, its problems outweigh any benefits the additional clarity 
provides (Bromley, 1994; Sindzingre, 2006; Ypeij, 2000).  
 Since defining a concept solely by what it is not can be problematic, many 
researchers rely on a business’s relationship with the government to determine 
whether it is formal or informal.  This manner of classification is not only more 
straightforward than others, it is often easier to measure than those 
conceptualizations previously discussed.  To define the informal sector, Schneider 
and Enste (2002) divide the economy into two separate entities: legal and illegal.  
The legal sector consists of both transactions accounted for by the GDP and those 
things the GDP does not account for by design, referred to as the “self-sufficient 
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economy.”  The illegal sector includes both the criminal and informal economies.  
The criminal economy consists of trade in illegal goods, such as drugs and stolen 
items, while the informal economy consists of trade in legal goods that are 
produced or sold in an illegal manner, such as not paying the correct taxes or 
noncompliance with industry regulations.  Finally, by definition, all transactions 
that take place in the informal economy are not included in a country’s reported 
GDP calculations but would be if they were properly reported to the government.  
While this definition of the informal economy is easy to comprehend, it is also 
exceedingly difficult to measure, a problem extensively addressed later in this 
paper (De Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1996; Schneider & Enste, 2002).    
 Many researchers are critical of these methods of conceptualization, as 
they tend to produce a dualistic model, a view that there are two sectors – the 
formal economy and informal economy – with no room in between (Chen, 2006; 
Murphy, 1990; Ypeij, 2000).  These scholars argue that the concept of informality 
is not dichotomous but continuous.  They stress the various characteristics 
associated with being informal (such as scale of production or relationship with 
the government) and note that a business can contain numerous combinations of 
these characteristics but not all of them.  These factors, they argue, indicate the 
gradations of informality within an economy and require researchers to use a 
different approach when discussing the subject (Murphy, 1990; Ypeij, 2000).  It is 
also important to recognize the wide variety of economic activities that get 
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grouped together in the two sector approach.  Murphy (1990) argues that the 
concept cannot be effectively studied with a dualistic approach due to this 
problem.  He notes that, in some studies, authors have classified both street 
vendors and professionals who work without reporting their hours as informal, 
stating that these two activities are so inherently different they cannot be studied 
as if they were the same.  According to Murphy, this manner of conceptualizing 
the informal economy implies a solution (reduce state involvement in regulating 
businesses) that is overly simplistic. (Murphy, 1990).  While the continuum of 
informality concept is undoubtedly useful, it is highly difficult to implement.  
 As previously established, this study will adopt the definition of informal 
economy used by Friedrich Schneider.  The informal economy consists of “all 
market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately 
concealed from public authorities” (Schneider, 2007, p. 4).  This term can refer to 
everything from avoiding payments of income taxes or social insurance payments 
to ignoring minimum wage requirements or not completing requisite government 
forms.  However, it specifically excludes any purposefully illegal activities, such 
as selling drugs (Schneider, 2007).  While this definition does exclude certain 
aspects of the economy that many would label informal, such as the criminal 
sector, it is best-suited for the type of analysis which follows.  The focus of this 
study is on those businesses which, if registered with the government, would be 
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supplying perfectly legal goods and services that would be calculated in with the 
GDP and other national statistics.    
 The selected definition is not perfect, a common criticism being that it 
produces a dualistic perception of the economy (Chen, 2006).  While that is an 
important concern to address, it is most important in the implementation of a 
successful case study involving discussions of the social repercussions of the 
varied levels of economic activity.6  The compilation of a dataset with that range 
of depth is simply not practical on a large scale.  The following project focuses on 
identifying underlying reasons entities avoid government regulation or taxation in 
the first place and goes on to discuss how this avoidance affects the country’s 
economy.  While a nuanced understanding of those entities comprising the 
informal economy is essential to interpreting the results and discussing them on a 
country-by-country basis, gathering that depth of information for every country is 
not necessary or realistic for a study of this nature.     
Competing Theories 
 As discussed in the introduction, the seminal Hart study of the late 
nineteen sixties provided a new and much-needed approach to studying the 
informal economy.  Hart’s in-depth case study of the economic situation in Ghana 
suggested two different ways in which to view informality, a precursor to 
economic growth or an impediment to the process.  Hart discussed the possibility 
                                                 
6
 Ypeij (2000) and Murphy (1990) – detractors of any dualistic division of the economy – conduct 
case studies in Peru and the Dominican Republic, respectively.   
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that the informal economy could lead to a cycle known as a vicious circle – 
trapping informal employees in a cycle of poverty.  The exceedingly low wages 
that often characterize informal jobs provide initial justification for this view.  
However, Hart is quick to point out that the informal economy may also provide 
aspiring business owners with the perfect opportunity to launch a business which 
would eventually be formalized.  He cites the flexibility inherent in informality as 
reason to believe that business owners are much more likely to begin here than in 
the formal sector due to the lower costs of failure (Hart, 1973).  Since the 
publication of this study, much of the research conducted attempts to classify the 
relationship between the informal economy and development (Perry et al., 2007).  
The two options proposed initially by Hart characterize the two theoretical camps 
that have since emerged to classify the nature of informality, structuralist and 
legalist. 
 Structuralist theory of informality is grounded in the class-based 
assumptions of neo-Marxist economic theories (Chen, 2006; Rakowski, 1994a).  
According to Marxism, rich capitalists exploit the poor in order to advance their 
personal well-being, both within and between states (Moser, 1994; Oatley, 2006).  
Structuralists view the informal economy as a mechanism through which the rich 
are able to exploit the poor within individual countries, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
They maintain that informality emerged as a result of the marginalization inherent 
in operating under a capitalist system and study the relationships that exist 
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Capitalist 
System 
Figure 2.1: Structuralist View of 
Informality 
Informal 
Economy Exploitation 
(generally described in terms of dominance and subordination) between large and 
small scale enterprises to support their theories.  This view of the informal 
economy is also described as petty commodity production, a term referring to the 
small size of informal activities relative to their formal counterparts (Moser, 1994; 
Murphy, 1990; Ypeij, 2000).  Researchers of the structuralist school tend to study 
the relationships between big firms and the smaller ones to whom they 
subcontract work, often at sporadic intervals for extremely low prices.  These 
studies note the essential role that smaller producers play in allowing large firms 
to generate profits, providing low-cost inputs which allow larger firms to extract 
higher revenues.  They are careful to mention how dependent the smaller 
producers become on larger enterprises for their survival, declaring that there are 
so many of these smaller businesses competing for survival they will never gain 
the upper hand in this relationship (International Labour Organization, 2002; 
Moser, 1994).  Structuralists recognize that there are varying degrees of 
subordination and exploitation within the economy, though they predict that 
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independent producers will eventually fall victim to the domination of larger 
firms (MacEwen Scott, 1979).  While the expected relationship between the size 
of a country’s informal economy and other variables is not always clear, 
structuralists predict a strong positive correlation between informality and 
inequality.  In this school of thought, informality is likened to a poverty trap, and 
scholars are quick to blame the capitalist economic structure for this trap’s 
existence (Murphy, 1990).  
 Though structuralist descriptions of informality are initially appealing, 
they do not adequately relay the complexity behind the concept.  Studies in this 
field tend to concentrate on the relationship between large firms and small 
producers.  Many informal businesses sell their goods and services directly to the 
consumer, cutting out the intermediary effect which results in the exploitative 
relationship and causing structuralist studies to overlook an entire subset of 
informal actors (Moser, 1994).  Though predictions that these producers will 
eventually become subordinate initially seem to address this issue there is no 
timeline associated with this calculation, making it difficult to prove either way 
(MacEwen Scott, 1979).  Structuralists subscribe to the neo-Marxist view that the 
informal economy results from the capitalist system.  Yet, in calculations of the 
informal economy’s size within individual countries, significant informal activity 
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is found in three Communist countries (Schneider & Bajada, 2005).7  The 
presence of a large informal economy during the Communist period in eastern 
Europe, is also widely recognized and studied (Kim, 2005; Neef, 2002).  This data 
provides strong evidence that informality is more than just an indicator of those 
problems inherent to the capitalist system.              
 Legalists provide another prominent set of beliefs through which to view 
informality.  Grounded in neo-liberal thought, this theory focuses on the role a 
country’s government plays in fostering informal activity (Chen, 2006; Rakowski, 
1994a).  Neo-liberal economists believe that government intervention into the 
market is harmful and should be kept to a minimum, a principle that provides the 
basis for legalist theory (Oatley, 2006).  Advocates, including Hernando De Soto, 
suggest decreased government intervention in business on all fronts, after 
ensuring a minimum of contract enforcement and recognition of land rights (De 
Soto, 1989; Murphy, 1990; Oatley, 2006; Rakowski, 1994a).  De Soto’s landmark 
study conducted in Peru during the eighties (discussed in detail in the 
introduction) provided astounding evidence that the government truly was stifling 
the growth of vibrant formal businesses (De Soto, 1989; Murphy, 1990).  While 
legalist scholars focus on the barriers to market entry, they recognize that large, 
                                                 
7
 Though one could argue the degree to which the designated countries operate under a 
Communist system (China, Lao PDR, Vietnam), the fact that each supports a higher level of 
informal economic activity (ranging from 13.1% to 33.4%) than many advanced capitalist 
countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, is a blow to neo-Marxist 
claims (Schneider & Bajada, 2005).  
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formal firms are often in collusion with governments and help to create a system 
to their benefit (Chen, 2006; Rakowski, 1994a).  Despite these setbacks, legalists 
see informality as a path to further economic growth if governments recognize the 
problem and provide the tools necessary for formalization, such as access to loans 
and property rights (Rakowski, 1994a). 
 Excessive government regulation is the heart of informal activity 
according to legalist theory (Rakowski, 1994a).  Regulations adopted by the state 
can refer to anything from environmental or quality standards that firms must 
comply with to restrictions meant to protect the rights of workers, encompassing a 
wide variety of activities.  A study using data collected from Latin American 
countries in 1990 found that government regulation is positively correlated with 
the size of the informal economy (Loayza, 1996).  This relationship was found to 
be robust in a 1998 study which used data from Latin American, transition, and 
OECD economies to test various measures of regulation against the size of the 
country’s informal economy.  High degrees of regulation consistently had positive 
correlations with amount of informal activity within the country (Johnson, 
Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1998).  Prominent scholars in the field largely 
accept this relationship, though they are quick to note that the degree to which the 
regulations are enforced are just as, if not more, important than the regulations 
themselves (Johnson et al., 1998; Schneider, 2005; Tedds, 2005).       
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 Critics of this school of thought claim that the legalist prediction of 
informality leading to economic growth is at best speculative and likely to hurt 
the country’s development (Portes, 1991).  However, the legalist view of 
informality as a precursor to future economic growth, given good government 
policies, is supported by an array of researchers who have empirical evidence to 
back their claims.  Many legalist scholars believe that entering the informal sector 
is simply the first step in the process of formalizing a business.  According to 
Williams, the road to legitimacy through the formal economy is long, and 
individuals enter it gradually and with caution.  The flexibility which 
characterizes the informal economy provides the perfect setting for potential 
entrepreneurs to hold a trial run of their proposed businesses in order to determine 
whether or not the hassle of formalizing is worth the benefits (Williams, 2005a; 
Williams & Round, 2007).  In a study performed in England, Williams found that 
the majority of informal work was undertaken by self-employed individuals 
(undermining the assumption of many structuralists that everyone employed 
informally is subordinate to a dominating upper class) and that about one third of 
these self-employed individuals were part of the informal economy for the sole 
reason of formalizing in the future.   Williams suggests that the best response of 
governments would be to increase the incentives for entering the formal economy, 
while leaving the informal economy to serve as an incubator for small businesses 
(Williams, 2005a).  A similar population of informal business owners on the 
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border of formalization exists in the Ukraine, suggesting that this phenomenon is 
not limited the developed countries (Williams & Round, 2007).  However, 
additional studies suggest that the informal economy is related to slow economic 
growth.  Researchers studying Latin American nations found a strong negative 
correlation between the two variables, claiming that the informal economy causes 
a loss of tax revenue which funds important public services while simultaneously 
increasing the need for those very services (Loayza, 1996).  While these findings 
initially appear at odds, they actually point to the same conclusion: given an 
acceptable level of regulations the informal economy can serve to propel 
economic growth.  The Williams study found that one-third of informal 
individuals wanted to formalize.  He goes on to detail the difficulty of 
formalization, which underlines the second study’s conclusion that the informal 
economy is correlated with slow growth as its participants are simply evading the 
burden of excessive taxes and regulation (Loayza, 1996; Williams, 2005a).    
 Legalist scholars view the informal economy as a mechanism to absorb 
formal workers who are left unemployed by sudden shifts in the economy while 
claiming that informal businesses are disadvantaged by their illegal status (Chen, 
2006; Forastieri, 1999; Rakowski, 1994a).  These assumptions tend to produce 
varying predictions of the relationship between inequality and the informal 
economy.  Some scholars believe that informality and the informal economy are 
positively correlated, stating the loss in tax revenue deteriorates necessary social 
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programs that correct for inequality (Kim, 2005; Rosser, Rosser, & Ahmed, 
2000).  This view is supported by an empirical study using data from sixteen 
European transition countries.  The results of this research found a significant, 
positive correlation between the two variables, indicating that high levels of 
inequality are related to a high degree of informal activity (Rosser et al., 2000).  
However, other scholars predict that inequality will decrease with the size of the 
informal economy, claiming that informal businesses smoothes the income gap.  
Those who support this view assert that the informal economy unintentionally 
serves to redistribute wealth as the poor do not pay taxes while the rich pick up 
the costs of public programs.  The main difference between these predictions is, 
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as in the case of economic growth, the reason why businesses entered the informal 
sector (Kim, 2005). 
 An in-depth look into legalist theory, provided above, results in a 
compound set of predictions.  As shown in Figure 2.2, legalists predict that the 
outcome of the informal economy depends on the types of policies enacted by the 
state.  When the government provides an environment conducive to businesses, 
with moderate taxes and regulation, the informal economy will simply serve as a 
testing ground for businesses interested in formalizing (Williams, 2005a; 
Williams & Round, 2007).  However, if the government is over-zealous in 
enacting regulations and imposing high taxes, the informal economy will also 
attract businesses who wish to avoid these burdens, or cannot afford to comply 
with them.  This second set of informal actors will cause a reduction in the 
amount of taxes collected, allowing the government to spend less money on social 
programs and eventually slowing economic growth while raising inequality (De 
Soto, 1989; Rakowski, 1994a).  
 While the legalist perspective provides strong grounding for the position 
that informality is a result of over-regulation, its assumption that the number and 
quality of regulations are the only factors of concern is inadequate.  Why are 
government policies the only consideration of individuals on the cusp of 
informality?  Given the wide array of factors which face any individual making 
this decision, additional variables must be accounted for as well.  In order to 
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better explain individual decisions regarding economic activity, informality must 
be viewed through the lens of a theory designed to explain individual behavior – 
rational choice theory. 
   Rational choice theory, illustrated in Figure 2.3, assumes that individuals 
always act to maximize their utility given the available information on the costs 
and benefits of such action (Anderson, 2006; Kraft & Furlong, 2007).  Though 
originally developed to explain the behavior of individuals, researchers in many 
disciplines now apply rational choice theory to groups of people with similar 
interests in order to predict their behavior (Anderson, 2006).  A rational choice 
approach to the informal economy suggests that there are numerous reasons 
explaining whether or not individuals will formalize.  Schneider and Enste (2002) 
elaborated on rational choice theory to develop a holistic explanation for 
participation in the informal economy.  They predict that circumstantial 
characteristics (i.e. norms and restrictions) combine with personal characteristics 
of the individual (i.e. motivation) to determine behavior, suggesting that 
explanations for entry should be drawn from many disciplines instead of focusing 
on economics.  Though this study focuses on the regulatory and moral reasons 
behind entry, their model suggests that the informal economy results from many 
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variables, a prediction which supports the use of a rational choice in future studies 
(F. Schneider & Enste, 2002).8       
 Rational choice theory provides the basis for many studies that predict 
relationships between the informal economy and other variables.  Dreher and 
Schneider (2006) discuss the impact of corruption on both high and low income 
countries.  Their study declares the nature of corruption in low income countries 
to be different from that of high income countries.  For example, one could 
reasonably expect corrupt officials in developing countries to accept bribes from 
informal businesses, reducing the costs of operating in that sector; this behavior 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed description of this model, see Chapter Six of The Shadow Economy: An 
International Survey (F. Schneider & Enste, 2002). 
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would not be as likely in more developed countries, so corruption is less likely to 
affect informality.  The empirical evidence backed this hypothesis (Dreher & 
Schneider, 2006).  Though the researchers in this study did not directly cite 
rational choice theory to validate their hypothesis, they indirectly relied on it, 
assuming all actors would make their decisions according to the information 
available and to maximize their utility.  This is far from the only study to use the 
logic of rational choice to explain informal activity; the theory is often invoked 
when explaining the decision of individual actors to enter the informal sector 
(Chong & Gradstein, 2007; De Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1996).  
 As suggested earlier, both rational choice theory and the legalist 
perspective fall short of providing an adequate explanation of informality.  
Rational choice theory allows for exploration of reasons why individuals chose 
not to formalize, though it does not make predictions of how informality affects 
the big picture (Anderson, 2006; Kraft & Furlong, 2007).  Using this theory as a 
base, education, gender equality, poverty, and corruption appear to be just as 
important as tax rates, regulations, and tax morality in determining an individual’s 
entry into the informal sector.  On the other hand, the legalist perspective provides 
clear predictions of how informality will affect the country’s overall economic 
situation, though it does not allow for variation in why actors decide to formalize 
(Rakowski, 1994a; Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing, 2008).  A legalist theoretical base also allows for variation in results 
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based on differing starting points, in which a country has either conducive or 
restrictive business policies.  This study will use a combination of rational choice 
and legalist theories, referred to as rational legalist theory for the remainder of the 
paper, to explain both the causes and the consequences of informality.  As 
illustrated in Figure 2.4, the rational legalist approach incorporates the flexibility 
of rational choice theory by allowing for multiple causes of informality.  The sum 
total of constraints and incentives to enter the formal sector leads to an 
equilibrium which is either positive or negative.  If positive, the majority of 
informal sector activity can be classified as start-up activity, referring to 
businesses for which informality serves as a testing ground for future 
formalization.  However, if this equilibrium is negative, the majority of informal 
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sector activity is theorized to be evasive activity, encompassing those 
entrepreneurs avoiding the costs of formalization.  As in legalist theory, the 
equilibrium reached leads to a distinct prediction of how it will affect the overall 
development of an individual country.   
   While it is practically tautological to claim that governments with good 
business environments, high levels of human capital, and gender equality have 
higher rates of growth, it is important to note that this is not the relationship 
proposed by the model.  The rational legalist theory predicts that after countries 
are separated into two groups by the variables listed above (gender equality, 
education, corruption, etc.), the predicted outcomes (high/low growth) will be 
correlated to the size of the informal economy.  Countries that have conducive 
environments are predicted to have growth rates that are positively correlated to 
the level of informality within the country.  In this situation, the informal 
economy is predicted to consist mainly of start-up businesses which formalize 
when the opportunity arises.  However, those countries which fall in the 
“restrictive” category are predicted to have growth rates that are negatively 
correlated with informality.  This equilibrium is predicted to result in a large 
number of businesses evading formality, resulting in stalled growth within the 
country. 
 While specifics of the explanatory variables are discussed in the following 
section, along with the rationale for their inclusion, it is essential to keep the 
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theoretical backing in mind throughout the discussion.  The informal economy 
consists of those businesses which are avoiding government oversight (Schneider 
& Bajada, 2005).  The rational legalist model predicts that there are many factors 
which can explain this behavior, but the effect that this avoidance will have on a 
country’s overall economic growth is determined by the individual’s underlying 
reasons for conducting business informally, as these reasons will determine future 
behavior of that individual, namely whether or not the informal business will 
eventually formalize.   
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This section will detail the selection rationale for and proposed 
relationship between a country’s informal economy and the proposed explanatory 
variables to be tested in this study.  Each variable is supported by the rational 
legalist model, and proposed relationships are discussed in context with past 
studies on the subject.  This description is followed by a detailed discussion of 
each measurement choice, with a focus on the informal economy.   
Selecting the Explanatory Variables 
Taxes, Regulation, and Government Quality 
 As discussed in the previous section, legalist theory tends to rely on the 
government’s intervention into the market as an explanation for informal activity.  
For this reason, both high tax rates and a high degree of government regulation 
have been established as causes of informality.  In addition to these variables, the 
ability of the government to enforce the regulations enacted and collect taxes is 
crucial (Johnson et al., 1998; Loayza, 1996; Schneider & Enste, 2002; Schneider, 
2007; Tedds, 2005).  Given the predictions of legalist theory, a positive 
relationship is expected between informal activity and the degree of taxation or 
regulation.  Informal activity will likely have a negative relationship with the 
quality of government, indicating the government’s ability to enforce those 
regulations and taxes enacted. 
Corruption         
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 Corruption is commonly portrayed as a determining factor in the 
emergence of informality when discussing lower and middle income countries.  
High levels of internal corruption effectively lower the cost of remaining 
informal, as business owners that are caught can expect to avoid punishment with 
a bribe (Dreher & Schneider, 2006).9  This phenomena is particularly likely to 
emerge in countries where taxes are extremely high and regulations dense, 
increasing the costs of compliance (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  As corruption 
reduces the cost of remaining informal through reducing the chances of being 
caught and formally punished, rational choice theory leads to the prediction of a 
positive relationship between corruption and informality within a given country 
(De Soto, 1989; Dreher & Schneider, 2006; Enste, 2005; Loayza, 1996)  
Poverty 
 As poverty is often described as a defining feature of the informal 
economy, the relationship between informality and low-income levels is hard to 
ignore (Mead & Morrisson, 1996; A. Ypeij, 2000).  The most common 
explanation for this relationship depicts the informal economy as a coping 
mechanism for those living in poverty.  Entering into informality is portrayed as a 
                                                 
9
 The study conducted by Dreher and Schneider (2006) separates high and low income countries to 
discover two different relationships between corruption and informality.  This study proposes that 
this relationship has less to do with income level and is more likely related to a range of other 
factors with are correlated with high income levels, such as more stable legal structures and better 
protection from extortion.  This is an issue addressed by the separating equilibrium of incentives 
and constraints presented in the theory chapter, essentially the second step in rational legalist 
theory.   
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last resort, necessary to the survival of low-income families.  Previous research 
has dubbed this type of activity the “survival economy,” finding that it comprises 
a large part of informal activity in both Romania and Bangladesh (Huq & Sultan, 
1991; Neef, 2002).  This theory relies on a model in which rational actors base 
entry into the informal economy by the gap between their desired and real income 
levels, meaning that those with extremely low incomes or high desired 
consumption will enter the informal economy (Kim, 2005).    Given the 
relationship between poverty and informal activity discussed above and presented 
in previous research, a positive relationship is expected between the two 
variables.          
Education 
 Education likely plays a role in the constraints an individual faces in 
entering the formal sector.  In countries where regulations and tax codes are 
arduous to follow, individuals with little to no education will find it more difficult 
to comply, even if they wish to do so.  As predicted by the rational choice theory, 
these individuals will recognize lack of education as a constraint to formalization 
and will be less likely to go through the process as a result.  Given this interaction, 
a negative relationship between education and informality is predicted.  This 
relationship is backed up by previous research that cites the problems faced by 
illiterate individuals attempting to access credit and other resources in order to 
start a business (Debrah, 2007; Huq & Sultan, 1991).  However, the empirical 
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evidence on this relationship is varied.  Though one case study indicated that 
members of the informal economy have higher average levels of education than 
the remainder of the country, other studies have noted the increased likelihood 
that individuals with lower education levels will be more likely to participate in 
the informal economy than their educated counterparts (Andresen, Ognedal, & 
Strom, 2005; Morrisson, Solignac Lecompte, & Oudin, 1994).    
Gender Equality 
 Though not as obvious as the previously proposed variables, gender 
equality within a country also plays a role in the decision to remain informal.  In 
countries where conventions depict men as breadwinners and women as 
homemakers, entering the formal sector can be particularly difficult for women.  
Finding employment as a woman under these circumstances is complicated 
further by the societal norms that often accompany them, making the husband feel 
inadequate if his salary is not sufficient to provide for his entire family (Mernissi, 
1987).  Research in the Middle East suggests that women in these highly 
traditional societies are more likely to engage in informal than formal economic 
activity as informality is by nature difficult to detect and therefore less apt to 
result in negative public consequences (Jennings, 1998; Mernissi, 1987).  Given 
the hypothesized effect of gender inequities, this type of inequality is predicted to 
cause more informal activity, resulting in a positive relationship with informality.   
Age Distribution 
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 This variable refers to the balance between age groups within a country.    
For example, a country with a disproportionately large number of retired 
individuals or young children as compared to middle-aged working individuals is 
considered to have an imbalanced age distribution.  Many of the studies 
researching the relationship between age distributions and development conclude 
that an excess of dependents within the country leads to much slower growth rates 
as investment is diverted to care for the young (Crenshaw, Ameen, & 
Christenson, 1997).  As a highly imbalanced age distribution will also likely 
affect an individual’s decisions regarding employment, it is important to address 
this variable in the context of choosing to enter the informal economy.  The 
inability to obtain a job in the formal sector, with its related benefits of labor 
protection and generally higher wages, is a commonly cited reason for informal 
activity, especially among the very young and old (Perry et al., 2007).  Given this 
information, it seems as though an age imbalance within a country’s population 
would lead to a larger informal economy as individuals of non-working age tend 
to have a more difficult time entering the formal sector than those of traditional 
working age.    
Exports 
 In order to compete on the world market, businesses within a given 
country must become more efficient as their level of exports increases.  Using 
data from the 1990’s, one study found that the job increases related to increased 
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exports went disproportionately to employment in the informal sector (Stallings & 
Peres, 2000).  There are several possible reasons for this.  On the one hand, 
increased exports mean that businesses are forced to be more efficient so they can 
compete in world markets.  If increased efficiencies led businesses to fire many of 
their previous workers, these individuals may find refuge in the informal sector 
(Marjit, Kar, & Beladi, 2007; Stallings & Peres, 2000).  The other explanation 
relies on the widely accepted assumption that the informal sector produces goods 
at a lower cost, as these businesses do not comply with costly government 
regulations (Rakowski, 1994a).  This argument suggests that firms will seek 
inputs at the lowest possible cost in order to produce a cheaper final good.  Both 
of these theoretical relationships would lead to a positive relationship between a 
country’s exports and the size of its informal economy. 
Growth 
 The inclusion of a measure of growth is essential to test the final section of 
rational legalist theory.  As previously discussed, rational legalist theory predicts 
that the informal economy will foster growth when the environment is conducive 
to businesses and inhibit growth when the environment is restrictive.  This 
prediction is based on two divergent theories which predict the outcome of 
informal activity.  The first theory predicts that the informal economy will lead to 
economic growth as it provides a starting point for entrepreneurs hoping to 
eventually formalize.  As these individuals enter the formal economy, their 
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earnings are officially recording in GDP calculations, leading to higher levels of 
recorded economic growth (Williams, 2005a).  Additionally, informal actors are 
forced to hide their activities from the authorities, causing them to operate on a 
smaller scale than is efficient so as not to be caught (Loayza, 1996).  
Formalization will allow these individual businesses to increase growth via 
savings in efficiency.  The more businesses that formalize, the larger the effect of 
this increased efficiency of growth.    The second growth theory regarding 
informal activity predicts exactly the opposite outcome, in which a large informal 
economy will lead to lowered economic growth.  This theory relies on an 
endogenous growth model, presented in further detail in Loayza (1996), which 
points to technological progress, partially dependent on congestible public 
services, as a main driver of economic growth.  The informal economy acts to 
increase the number of people using these services, while simultaneously 
decreasing the relative amount of money per capita spent on providing these 
services as informal actors do not pay taxes.  This decreases the utility derived 
from the use of these public services for everyone, leading the less technological 
progress which in turn inhibits growth (Loayza, 1996).  Rational legalist theory 
predicts that the positive effects of informality will outweigh the negative when 
the business environment is conducive, but the negative effects will overpower 
the positive ones in a restrictive environment. 
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Measuring the Variables 
 The final compilation is a panel data set containing the dependent variable, 
size of a country’s informal economy, measures for all eight explanatory variables 
discussed above, and each country’s GDP growth in 2005 to test the second half 
of the rational legalist theory.  This data set includes information for one hundred 
and twenty four countries10 in both 2000 and 2005.11  In cases where data for any 
of the chosen variables is unavailable, the country was dropped from the set.12  
Descriptive statistics for each of these variables is available in Appendix A.2.   
Informality 
 As the very nature of informality is characterized by hiding from the 
state’s notice, it follows that measuring this variable is inherently complicated.  
Accepted methods of estimating the informal economy range from conducting 
surveys and monitoring energy use within a country to gathering information on a 
range of variables in order to predict informal activity.  As each method of 
estimation is unique, they all come with a different set of problems to address.  
Surveys rely on individuals providing correct information regarding an activity 
                                                 
10
 There are 124 countries in the main data set.  For the additional data collected as check on the 
tax burden variable there are only 89 countries.  The countries included in the main dataset are 
listed in Appendix B.1, with a list of those dropped for the tests using the second tax burden 
variable in Appendix B.3.  
 
11
 With the exception of GDP growth rates, as only one year is used to test the second part of 
rational legalist theory. 
 
12
 While dropping variables due to lack of information brings up the problem of sample bias, very 
few countries were actually dropped for this reason.  Refer to the list in Appendix B2. 
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which, by definition, they are trying to conceal.  Additionally, this form of 
estimation is very difficult to do on a large scale, resulting in detailed information 
for a small number of countries.  For example, monitoring energy use is 
problematic as not all informal activities use electricity and available technology 
results in vastly differing energy use for the same end product, especially when 
comparing activity in different countries (Schneider & Bajada, 2005).13  The 
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple indicators multiple causes) model, using multiple 
variables to estimate informal activity, is used in this study.        
 The DYMIMIC model, first used in the early nineteen eighties, has since 
become a commonly accepted method to estimate informality (Loayza, 1996; 
Perry et al., 2007; Tedds, 2005).  This approach to estimation gathers two sets of 
data: causes that are theorized to lead to high levels of informality and indicators 
which are theorized to be results of informality.14  The dataset used in this study 
identifies tax burdens, regulations, GDP per capita, and unemployment among 
those variables considered as causes, while money supply, GDP growth, and 
employment are among those classified as indicators.  After compiling the list of 
causes and consequences, an econometric analysis which identifies the informal 
economy as a latent variable, is used to calculate an index of informality 
                                                 
13
 For an in-depth discussion of additional ways to estimate the size of a country’s informal 
economy, see Schneider & Bajada, (2005) or Giles and Tedds (2002). 
 
14
 For a further discussion of how the model to estimate this data was set up, refer to Appendix 
One in Schneider (2007). 
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(Schneider & Bajada, 2005; Schneider, 2007).  To acquire concrete numbers, a 
benchmark is needed.  This is provided through use of the currency demand 
estimation method, which examines the actual amount of currency in circulation 
compared to the predicted amount given a variety of conditions (wages, taxes, 
interest rates, etc).  Extra money in circulation is presumed to be a result of 
informal activity.  The use of currency demand estimation allows for the measure 
of informal economy to be presented as a percentage of GDP (Giles & Tedds, 
2002; Schneider, 2007).   
 As with any method of estimating informality, there are issues which must 
be recognized in using the DYMIMIC model.  Primarily, the estimates produced 
by this model are only as good as the variables used to calculate the data.  If the 
predicted relationships of causal and indicator variables with informality do not 
exist, the resulting estimates will be useless (Tedds, 2005).  In order to avoid this 
problem, Schneider (2007) uses only those variables which have widely accepted 
relationships with informality in the creation of his model.  The validity of these 
estimations is attested to by previous scholars who have included Schneider’s 
estimates in their work on informality (Chong & Gradstein, 2007; Dreher & 
Schneider, 2006; Perry et al., 2007).  The benefits of using the DYMIMIC model 
must also be accounted for.  Its flexibility allows for several factors, instead of 
only one, to play into the determination of estimates.  Also, the advantage of 
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having large datasets for cross-country comparisons, a particularly strong point 
with this model, is especially important for a study of this nature (Tedds, 2005).   
Regulatory Quality 
 Calculating the burden of regulations is complicated due to the multiple 
reasons that regulations can be oppressive to the growth of businesses.  The 
World Bank’s Regulatory Quality score produced for the World Governance 
Indicators dataset takes into account several measures complied by other 
institutions, from non-government and survey organizations to public and private 
firms.  This composite score is designed to capture the government’s ability to 
promote growth of business through the implementation of effective laws.  The 
final indicator accounts for a wide variety of regulatory burdens, including the 
complexity of the tax code, restrictions on competition (including trade barriers), 
and the difficulty of starting a business among many other factors.  Scores range 
from -2.36 to 2.03, with larger scores indicating better regulations (D. Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007; World Bank Institute, 2008).  The quality of this 
indicator is widely recognized, a fact highlighted by the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation’s decision to use it in calculations of a country’s level of economic 
freedom (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2008).  
Fiscal Freedom 
 As with regulation, it is essential to account for the tax burden within a 
country, but it is difficult to capture everything necessary using only one measure.  
Gardner 55 
 
For this reason a composite that considers multiple aspects of the tax burden is 
used.  The Fiscal Freedom score created by the Heritage Foundation takes into 
account the tax burden on individuals and corporations, as well as total tax 
revenue as a proportion of GDP.  This measure allows for a well-rounded view of 
the tax burden faced by individuals in the country, especially those in the formal 
sector (Heritage Foundation, 2008).  In calculating the 2008 Index of Economic 
Freedom, the Heritage Foundation released data for 1995-2008, updating all 
indices so data is comparable across years.  This updated data set is used in the 
following analysis.   
Government Effectiveness  
 The quality of government variable is meant to capture the degree to 
which the government is able to enact and carry out sound policies.  In order to 
quantify this concept, the Government Effectiveness indicator, compiled as part of 
the World Governance Indicators dataset, is used.  This measure is designed to 
account for the “quality of public services…civil service…policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies” (D. Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007, p. 3).  Similar to the other 
data gathered from the World Governance Indicator set, Government 
Effectiveness is compiled using a variety of measures gathered from several 
different sources (D. Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007).  The data ranges 
from -1.53 to 2.28, with higher scores indicating a more effective government and 
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lower scores indicating the opposite (World Bank Institute, 2008).  As with 
regulations, the quality of this indicator is recognized by the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation’s decision to use it in calculations of a country’s ability to 
rule justly (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2008). 
Control of Corruption 
 Corruption is predicted to have a positive correlation with informality, 
making avoidance of punishment when informal economic activity is detected 
much easier.  The following study utilizes the Control of Corruption measure 
compiled by the World Bank for the Word Governance Indicators to quantify 
corruption within a country.  This index compiles multiple measurements 
collected by other organizations to form the indicator.15  Designed to capture the 
degree to which “public power is exercised for private gain,” the Control of 
Corruption variable accounts for a wide range of activities, from the payment of 
small bribes to stay in business to large-scale activities performed by the 
country’s elite (D. Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007, p. 4; D. Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004).  Scores range from -1.47 to 2.41, with larger scores 
indicating less corruption within the country (more control of the problem) and 
lower scores indicating higher levels corruption (D. Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2007a; World Bank Institute, 2008).  This quality of this indicator is 
                                                 
15
 For further discussion of the World Governance Institute, see the discussion related to 
regulations. 
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widely recognized, a fact highlighted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s 
decision to use it in calculations of a country’s level of ruling justly (Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, 2008). 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
 This variable is meant to capture the severity of poverty within a given 
country, as the high costs of formalizing are predicted to cause elevated levels of 
informality.  Gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 2000 international dollars 
at purchasing power parity (PPP) is used to measure this variable as calculating 
GDP in this manner accounts for the differences in what can be bought from 
country to country with a given amount of money.  Though not perfect it is a 
common method of estimating poverty.  The data used below was collected by the 
World Bank and is available online the World Development Indicators database 
(World Bank Group, 2007).       
 As GDP per capita (PPP) results in a set of large numbers, especially in 
comparison to the other explanatory variables in the set, this measure is rescaled 
for the tests so as not to produce confusing results.  For the remainder of this 
study, this variable is measured in thousands of dollars.  So the United States, 
with a GDP per capita (PPP) of $37,267 in 2005, would have a recorded 
measurement of 37.27, while Malawi with a GDP per capita (PPP) of $594 would 
be measured as 0.59 (World Bank Group, 2007).   
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Education Index 
 The education variable is meant to capture the degree to which individuals 
within a given country have the skills necessary to comply with regulations and 
tax codes set by the government.  The United Nation’s education index, compiled 
as part of the Human Development Index (HDI), is used to quantify education 
within a country.  To control for the data collection and computation method 
changes that occur from year to year, standardized data which controls for these 
changes16 to produce comparable data is utilized (Human Development Report 
Office, 2008).17  The education index itself is calculated using two main 
indicators, adult literacy and gross enrollment ratios, resulting in an index score of 
0-1.  The score decreases to reflect lower education levels within the country 
(United Nations Development Program, 2007).    
 As the education index is measured from 0-1 while the majority of 
explanatory variables are presented on a much larger scale, this variable is 
rescaled in order to make the results as clear as possible.  Each education index 
score is multiplied by 100, so index scores now range from 0-100 instead of 0-1.  
                                                 
16
 The updated data is not available for all countries.  In cases where updated data was unavailable, 
the original index was used.  This substitution was only utilized in cases where the education 
index was unavailable for only one of the two years and allowed for the preservation of several 
data points.  
 
17
 This data is not readily available on the website, though is easily obtained by contacting the 
Statistics department of the UNDP.  
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The United States, with an education index of 0.97 in 2005 has a rescaled score of 
97 (Human Development Report Office, 2008).    
Female Labor Force Participation 
 In order to properly capture the degree of gender inequity within a 
country, this study will use the labor force participation rate of females found in 
the World Bank’s Word Development Indicators database.  Calculated by the 
International Labor Organization, this measure accounts for the percentage of 
females aged 15-64 who are economically active (World Bank Group, 2007).  As 
countries with higher levels of gender inequity will likely lead to lower levels of 
recognized economic participation among females, this variable will indicate 
whether or not this lower economic participation is correlated with higher levels 
of informal activity.   
Dependency Ratios  
 In order to capture the degree to which an age imbalance in a country’s 
population likely influences the level of informality, dependency ratios are 
utilized.   Dependency ratios measure the number of dependents, defined as 
individuals younger than 15 or older than 64, to those of working age.  A ratio 
above one indicates a country with more individuals of non-working age than of 
working age.  This data was gathered from the World Development Indicators 
database and is calculated by the World Bank (World Bank Group, 2007).  The 
relationship between informality and an age imbalance is expected to be positive.   
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 As the results are easier to report when all explanatory variables are scaled 
in a similar manner, dependency ratios have been rescaled for the purposes of this 
study.  The rescaled variable takes each dependency ratio and multiplies it by a 
hundred.  Where a score of one used to signify a perfect balance of working age 
individuals and dependents, this is now signified by one hundred.  A dependency 
ratio of 0.70, rescaled to 70, indicates that there are seven dependents to every ten 
individuals of working age within that country’s population.    
Exports 
 Exports are measured using the total merchandise exports data from the 
World Trade Organization.  This data set accounts for all goods that the country 
exported within a given year, using the transaction value to quantify how much 
the goods are worth.  General trade figures are used for most points, though in 
situations where that information is not available special trade numbers are used 
(World Trade Organization, 2008).  The statistics provided by the World Trade 
Organization do not account for the overall size of the economy,18 so each data 
point was divided by the country’s GDP in order to achieve a percentage measure 
of exports to the size of the country’s economy.  The GDP figures from the World 
Development Indicators database are used to make this calculation (World Bank 
Group, 2007). 
 
                                                 
18
 The data is provided in terms of current US dollars. 
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Growth 
 Though not an explanatory variable, finding a measure for a country’s 
economic growth is essential to test the second part of rational legalist theory.  
For the purposes of this study, economic growth is captured by the annual change 
in GDP, as calculated by the World Bank using data from their own records as 
well as OECD national accounts information (World Bank Group, 2007).    
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Part IV 
 
Methods & Results: Causal Factors 
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The following section gives an in-depth description of the methods used to 
test the first part of rational legalist theory, followed by an in-depth discussion of 
the results of those tests and their significance.  The first set of tests is designed to 
determine which of the proposed explanatory variables are actually correlated 
with the informal economy.  These results indicate that female labor force 
participation, poverty, and dependency ratios are strongly correlated with 
informality, while measures of government effectiveness and the education index 
have slightly weaker relationships with the dependent variable.  Traditional 
explanations of informality, measures of regulations, the fiscal burden, and 
control of corruption measures were found to be insignificant, though there are 
probably additional factors at work.   
Methods 
 As presented in Part II, the first step in testing rational legalist theory is to 
establish which of the explanatory variables presented are truly determinants of 
informality.  This is accomplished through a first-differenced regression.  As its 
name suggests, the first-differenced model uses the difference in observations of a 
given variable between 2000 and 2005 in order to test whether or not the changes 
in explanatory variables are correlated with changes in the dependent variable.  A 
better understanding of what causes changes in the size of a country’s informal 
economy provides a more detailed understanding of the state’s overall level if 
informal activity, and the first-differenced equation allows for results stronger 
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than those from a pooled panel data test by controlling for unmeasured variations 
inherent between countries.  For example, part of the variation in informality 
between the United States and Peru can be explained by the increased tolerance of 
informal businesses among the general public in Peru.  It is simply easier to 
conduct business informally if more people are willing to buy from informal 
businesses.  As this is a variable unlikely to change in five years and exceedingly 
difficult to quantify, the first-differenced equation effectively controls for it (and 
other variations of this nature) by focusing on the shift in size of the informal 
economy instead of looking at the size alone (Woolridge, 2006).  As shown in 
Figure 3.1, this method of estimation utilizes the change in size of the informal 
economy from 2000 to 2005 as the independent variable, and estimates the 
importance of explanatory variables by looking at the change in these measures 
between the same time period.  Equation One represents a general first differences 
equation, while Equation Two is the specific model used to test the data.19  
 Though the use of first-differenced regressions does come with a few 
sacrifices, these loses are well-worth the benefits provided by using the model.  
As previously discussed, a first differenced regression controls for those 
environmental variations between countries which are difficult to measure.  Data 
points are calculated by taking the difference of two observations, so this model 
has lower statistical power than performing the tests as a pooled panel data set, 
                                                 
19
 For a further discussion of how Equation One is derived, please refer to (Moody, 2005; 
Woolridge, 2006).  
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which would essentially ignore the fact that there are two observations in each 
country. 20  The data set for this study is particularly strong, with complete 
information on one hundred and twenty four countries, so the statistical power 
lost by using a first-differenced model is not a problem. 
 
Figure 4.1: First Differenced Equation 
 
(yi2005 - yi2000)  =  δ0  +  β1(xi(2005)1 – xi(2000)1)  +  β2(xi(2005)2 – 
xi(2000)2)  +   …  + (ui2005 – ui2000 )                                       
   
(Equation One: General) 
 
∆inf   =  δ 0 +  β1∆gen  +  β2∆edu  +  β3∆cor +  β4∆pov+  β5∆reg   
+ β6∆tax  +  β7∆qua l+  β8∆age +  β9∆ex  +  ∆ui                  
     
(Equation Two: Specific) 
 
                                                 
20
 By taking the difference between 2000 and 2005 to serve as the variable of interest, the dataset 
is reduced to one observation where there were two.  The pooled testing method would run each 
observation as an individual data point with a dummy variable to control for time. 
inf= size of the informal economy  ( DV) 
δ = change due to time (IV) 
gen = female labor force participation (IV) 
edu = education index (IV) 
cor = control of corruption measure (IV) 
 ex = exports (IV) 
pov = GDP per capita PPP (IV) 
reg = regulatory quality measure (IV) 
tax = fiscal freedom measure (IV) 
qual = gov’t effectiveness (IV) 
age = dependency ratios (IV) 
 
DV – Dependent Variable 
IV – Independent variable 
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Results 
The results of the first test, a first-differenced regression, are presented in Figure 4.2 on 
the following page.  While looking at the correlation coefficients alone to make judgments is 
tempting, it is important to remember that these statistics must be interpreted in the context with 
the scale on which the variable is reported, as well as the level of statistical significance.21  
Figure 4.2 is organized with correlation coefficients listed above the standard errors, which are in 
parentheses.  In order to present the data in a way which is not misleading upon first glance, 
several of the variables have been rescaled.22   
                                                 
21
 For a quick reminder of this scale, refer to Figure A.2 in Appendix A or the Data section of this paper. 
22
  A further discussion of this decision is located in the previous section.  The rescaled variables include poverty, 
education, and dependency rations. 
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Figure 4.2 First-Differenced Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Informal Economy 
Independent 
Variables Test One Test Two Test Three 
Female Labor -0.12** -0.11** -0.12*** 
 Force Participation (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education Index 0.05^ 0.04 - 
  (0.04) (0.04)  
Control of -0.18 - - 
Corruption  (0.76)   
GDP per capita  -0.56*** -0.62*** -0.56*** 
(PPP) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) 
Fiscal Freedom -0.01 - - 
  (0.02)   
Regulatory Quality -0.62 - - 
  (0.67)   
Dependency Ratios -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Government  1.13* 0.72 - 
Effectiveness (0.77) (0.60)  
Exports 0.76 - - 
 (1.47)   
Constant 0.73** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
  (0.31) (0.28) (0.26) 
Adj. R2 0.296 0.308 0.301 
       
F-Stat 6.76 11.95 18.62 
  
     
Degrees of  123 123 123 
 Freedom    
 
The first numbers are regression coefficients (β), while the numbers in 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
 
***  Significant at 1% level 
**    Significant at 5% level 
*      Significant at 15% level          ^ Significance at the 20% level 
 
Sources:  See Figure A.1 in Appendix A 
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 The initial regression performed, Test One, indicates that many of the 
variables expected to cause informal activity are unrelated to changes in its size.  
Though the correlation coefficients for the measures of corruption control, 
regulatory burden, fiscal freedom, and exports reflect the relationships predicted, 
each of these relationships is statistically insignificant.  In fact, a test of joint 
significance indicates that these variables can be dropped simultaneously using 
any commonly accepted level of significance.23  As correlation among the 
independent variables is very low, and heteroskedasticiy is not a problem, these 
issues are not factoring into the presented results.24  The second test presented in 
Figure 4.2 drops those variables found to be jointly insignificant, strengthening 
the overall regression as seen through the adjusted R2.  While the third test in 
Figure 4.1 drops both of the variables which are insignificant at the 20% level,25 
doing so lowers the overall power of the equation as reflected in the adjusted R2.  
It should be noted here that the variance in first differenced data is often smaller 
than what would be ideal.  This can be seen in Figure A.3 in Appendix A, and 
often results in the problem of inflated standard errors26 (Woolridge, 2006).  This 
issue should be fully considered before dropping any variables or deciding that 
they are insignificant.  There are several possible reasons that the variation is low.  
                                                 
23
 An F-test indicates that these variables are jointly insignificant, with a p-value of 0.73. 
24
 Refer to Figure A.4 in Appendix A for a table with all correlations.  
25
 Going back to Regression One, a test of joint significance indicates that these two variables can 
be dropped along with the other jointly insignificant variables, though the p-value is much lower.    
26
 Inflated standard errors affect estimates of statistical significance. 
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Not only is the period of observation rather short,27 but certain variables, such as 
education and government quality, are likely to be slow to change in only five 
years.  With these problems in mind, the results from the second regression will 
be those primarily referred to in the following discussion of results. 
Surprisingly, the relationships of both the education index and dependency 
ratios are opposite of the theoretical predictions.  As shown in Figure 4.2, an 
increase in the education index is associated with an increase in informality.  
However, the correlation coefficient indicates that the practical significance of 
this relationship is also quite low, with a tenth of a point increase in education 
index28 leading to half a percent increase in the informal economy.  As the 
education index is calculated using information on gross enrollment ratios for 
primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling along with literacy rates, a tenth of a 
point increase would be equivalent to an increase of 15% in the literacy rate or a 
30% increase in gross enrollment ratios (Human Development Reports, 2007).  
For the small change of 0.05% in the informal economy, this relationship is not 
practically significant.  The relationship between a country’s dependency ratios 
and the informal economy is also opposite to theoretical expectations, with more 
individuals of traditional working age (15-64 years old) being related to a larger 
informal economy.  Practically, a tenth of a point increase in the dependency 
                                                 
27
 This was the longest period (2000 to 2005) that could be utilized given available estimates of 
the informal economy.   
28
 Remember that the education index was rescaled for the purposes of this test to range from 0-
100 instead of 0-1.   
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ratio29 is associated with a 1.6% decrease in the size of the informal economy as a 
percentage of GDP.  A tenth of a point increase in a country’s dependency ratio 
could be brought about if a country with a perfect balance of ten dependents to ten 
individuals of working age shifted to eleven dependents per ten working age 
citizens, perhaps brought about by a decrease in the infant mortality rate in a 
given country.     
The female labor force participation measure and GDP per capita (PPP) 
variables reflect the predicted relationship with informality and are also 
significant from a practical standpoint.  Practically, a $1,000 increase in GDP, per 
capita (PPP) is associated with a 0.62% decrease in the size of the informal 
economy as a percentage of GDP.  This is equivalent to saying that a $10,000 
difference in GDP per capita (PPP), or roughly the difference between the United 
States and Japan in 2005, accounts for a difference of 6.2% in the size of the 
informal economy (World Bank Group, 2007).  As previously stated, the 
correlation between female labor force participation and the informal economy is 
in the predicted direction with an increase in the number women participating in 
the labor force associated with a decrease in the informal economy as a share of 
GDP.   A ten percent increase in women participating in the labor force is related 
to a 1.2% decrease in the size of the informal economy (as a percentage of GDP).  
This means that a 30% increase in the labor force participation rates by females, 
                                                 
29
 This variable was rescaled as well.  Instead of 1 meaning that the two age groups are equal, 100 
signifies that occurrence.   
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or essentially the difference between the United States and Chile in 2005, is 
associated with a 3.6% difference in the size of the informal economy (World 
Bank Group, 2007).  
Though the statistical significance of the government effectiveness 
measure  is borderline,30 the actual relationship between the government 
effectiveness composite and the informal economy is opposite of what was 
predicted.  While the practical significance of this relationship is less intuitive, it 
is also rather low.  A one point increase in the government effectiveness score 
correlates with a less than one percent increase in the informal economy.  As the 
government effectiveness measure runs from about -2.5 to 2.5, an increase of one 
is actually quite large, especially in relation to such a small change in the informal 
economy.  This difference is essentially the same as that between Germany and 
Croatia in 2005 (World Bank Institute, 2008).     
Correcting Possible Problems 
Given the strong body of literature supporting the ties between 
regulations, taxes, corruption, and the informal economy31 these results are highly 
unexpected.  There are a few possible reasons for this apparent difference, from 
lack of sufficient variability in the data to problems with those measures used to 
                                                 
30
 As mentioned earlier, the standard errors on several of these variables maybe inflated due to low 
variance in first-differenced data.  For this reason, some leeway is granted to those variables with 
lower levels of statistical significance than what is normally considered appropriate. 
31These studies are discussed in great detail throughout Part II. 
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quantify the variables.  Both of the problems are discussed in greater detail within 
this section. 
The first issue that must be addressed in using a first-differenced equation 
is the problem of variability within the data.  While this is obviously more of a 
concern in those variables less likely to change in a five year period, such as 
education, it is something that affects the entire regression to some degree.32  This 
could easily be corrected by treating the data as a random sample pooled panel 
set, essentially performing a cross-section test on the data while controlling for 
the year as though it were just another variable.  However, this method of testing 
would be inappropriate as it does not control for those variables inherent to each 
country that are likely remain constant over time (such as the cultural acceptance 
of informality).  As these factors are highly difficult to quantify, it is necessary to 
use a first-differenced regression to control for them.  Finally, the data was 
collected in a manner to ensure that two data points exist for each country which 
makes the assumption of a random sample difficult to defend (Woolridge, 2006).     
The other possible problem, using a measure that does not properly reflect 
the variable in question, is easier to test.  The robustness of the indicators 
compiled by the World Governance Institute is quite high given the manner in 
which they are calculated.33  However, the concepts discussed are not easy to 
                                                 
32
 See Appendix A.3 in for information concerning the variability of the first-differenced data. 
33
 Refer to the discussion of the regulations in the previous section for a further description of the 
World Governance Indicators. 
Gardner 73 
 
capture, and no measure is perfect.  For this reason, alternate tests are conducted 
using different measures of regulations, tax burden, and corruption.  For 
regulations, the measure of Business Freedom, calculated by the Heritage 
Foundation, is utilized.34  The corruption check also uses an indicator compiled by 
the Heritage Foundation, entitled Freedom from Corruption.35  The final alternate 
indicator employed measures the tax burden faced by individuals within a given 
country.  This is quantified by the estimates on a country’s top marginal tax rate, 
as determined by the Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney et al., 
2007).36     
The results of using alternate measures for the variables as described 
above are listed in Figure 4.3.  The first column of data refers to the results of 
Test One in Figure 4.2, provided for ready comparison between the two tests, 
while the fourth and fifth tests are conducted using the new test measures of the 
three variables in question.  Test Six is performed using the new measures of 
corruption and regulations with the old tax burden measure.  This is necessary 
                                                 
34
 The Business Freedom measure identifies indicators of burdensome regulations (such as the 
number of procedures to start and close a business, the cost of doing so, time it takes to obtain the 
proper license, etc.) and assigns each country a score with 100 indicated the best regulatory 
environment possible for a business (Heritage Foundation, 2008).    
35
 The Freedom from Corruption variable measures the degree to which a country’s citizens are 
free from the burdens that accompany high degrees of corruption.  This measure is primarily based 
on perceptions of corruption, with a focus on how they affect an individual’s ability to conduct 
business.  Each country is assigned a score with indicating the most corruption and 100 indicating 
the least (Heritage Foundation, 2008).    
36This measure is actually an index of the top marginal tax rates.  The Fraser Institute collects the 
marginal tax rates of both income and payroll taxes within each country, and indexes the largest 
one for this measure.  Large scores indicate those countries with lower tax rates, while small 
scores indicate higher tax rates (Gwartney et al., 2007 
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given the severe drop in observations required by using the new measure of tax 
burden and subsequent changes in several of the unrelated variables.  The switch 
results in the loss of thirty five observations,37 introducing the possibility of bias 
and requiring a comparison using just those measures which are able to fully 
utilize the original sample. 
As shown in test six of Figure 4.3, the shift in measurement changes the 
significance of both the tax burden and corruption variables, while regulation 
remains insignificant.  Though the corruption variable appears changed with the 
use of a new measure, a quick look at the sixth regression suggests that the shift is 
actually due to an interference of the new tax burden variable.  While this could 
be due to an unanticipated interaction between the top marginal tax rate and 
perceptions of corruption within a country, it is more likely that the exclusion of 
so many countries, due to unavailability of data, is the true root of this change.  
Though the education variable is no longer significant with the change in 
measures, this is not a surprising finding.  The education index was only 
important at a very lax degree of significance in previous tests.  As the alteration 
in measurements does not affect the predicted relationship between variables, it 
can be safely concluded that this shift is not of great importance to the overall 
results of these tests. 
                                                 
37
 For a list and further discussion of those countries dropped by switching to the second measure 
of tax burden, see Figure B.3 in Appendix B. 
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While changes in the significance of the tax burden variables are 
important, the importance of this change should not be over-stated.  While the 
direction of the relationship is as predicted,38 with an increase in the top marginal 
tax rate accompanying an increase in the informal economy, the practical 
significance appears to be rather low.  As the scores for the top marginal tax rate 
range from 1-10, a one point shift is rather large and results in the small decrease 
of 0.18 % in the size of the informal economy (as part of GDP).  This combined 
with the low level of statistical significance and the problem of a reduced sample 
size suggests that changes in the tax burden measure are not important in this set 
of tests.   
 
                                                 
38
 Remember that the data released by the EFW is an index of top marginal tax rates, with larger 
scores indicating better (i.e. lower) tax rates and lower scores indicated higher tax rates (Gwartney 
et al., 2007). 
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Figure 4.3 First-Differenced Regression Results, Second Round 
 
Dependent Variable: Informal Economy 
Independent Variables Test One Test Four Test Five Test Six 
Female Labor  -0.12** -.12** -0.12** -0.12** 
Force Participation (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education Index 0.05* 0.06 - 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.06)  (0.04) 
Control of -0.18 - - - 
Corruption (0.76)    
Freedom from  - -0.03^ -0.03* -0.001 
Corruption (test)  (0.02) (0.2) (0.02) 
GDP per capita 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 
(PPP) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
Fiscal Freedom -0.01 - - -0.01 
 (0.02)   (0.02) 
Top marginal tax - -0.19* -0.18* - 
 rates (test)  (0.12) (0.12)  
Regulatory  -0.62 - - - 
Quality (0.67)    
Business  - -0.001 - -0.02 
Freedom (test)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Dependency   0.16*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 
Ratios (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Government 1.13* 1.59** 1.60** 0.80^ 
Effectiveness (0.77) (0.80) (0.78) (0.61) 
Exports 0.76 0.53 - 0.75 
 (1.47) (1.69)  (1.46) 
Constant 0.73** 0.54* 0.58** 0.83*** 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) 
Adj. R2 0.296 0.366 0.380 0.299 
F-Stat 6.76 6.63 10.01 6.82 
Degrees of     
Freedom 123 88 88 123 
The first numbers are regression coefficients (β), while the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
 
***  Significant at 1% level             *    Significant at 15% level 
**    Significant at 5% level   ^ Significance at the 20% level     
 
Sources:  See Figure A.1 in Appendix A 
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Further Discussion 
As previously stated, the apparent insignificance of the regulation, 
corruption, and tax burden measures in determining changes in  informality within 
a country is unexpected.  Given the rich history of literature supporting this 
connection, a truly insignificant relationship between these variables is highly 
unlikely.  Instead, the changes which are brought about by shifts in these variables 
may not immediately take effect, filtering through the system in order to affect the 
informal economy.  Individuals may have less trust in the government, making 
their actions a little more delayed than they would be with other explanatory 
factors.  This combined with the short period of time (five years) during which 
changes are observed likely contributes to the low level of correlation between 
these variables and the informal economy.  As none of the previous studies use 
first-differenced data in their tests of informality and its causal relations, these 
results are important in establishing that the relationship between these 
traditionally discussed causal variables and informality is not as straightforward 
as previous research suggests (Dreher & Schneider, 2006; Johnson et al., 1998; 
Loayza, 1996).  What these findings do suggest is that there are other factors 
which may be just as, if not more, important in determining informality as those 
traditionally discussed.   
While the relationship between exports and informality is also 
insignificant, the theoretical backing is not as strongly established, therefore this 
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finding is less puzzling.  The insignificance of this relationship could indicate that 
the theorized effect of exports is counteracted by other effects.  For example, 
informal businesses may supply cheap inputs which substantially lower the 
quality of the final goods, harming exporters in the long-run.  This relationship 
could also indicate that an increase in exports causes businesses to hire additional 
formal labor to meet the rising demand for their product, exactly opposite to the 
response predicted.  This does not change the fact that previous research indicates 
an increased number of exports creates many more informal jobs than formal ones 
(Marjit et al., 2007; Stallings & Peres, 2000).  However, it is quite likely that 
these informal jobs generate very little money and are overshadowed by the 
formal jobs created which likely have a higher value added.  This would still lead 
to a decrease in informal activity as measured by a percentage of the country’s 
GDP.  These results could also indicate that exports are irrelevant to the growth of 
the informal sector.  Further tests would have to be conducted in order to tease out 
the true relationship (or lack thereof).   
Another surprising result of the previous tests is the unexpected direction 
of the relationship between many of the explanatory variables and informality, 
specifically the education index, government effectiveness, and dependency 
ratios.  The positive correlation between higher numbers of working age 
individuals and informality indicates that more individuals of working age leads 
to a larger informal economy.  This is in direct contrast with the theory that a 
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larger number of elderly or young would lead to an increased informal economy 
as they are expected to have a harder time finding employment in the formal 
sector (Perry et al., 2007).  One possibility for this finding is that a larger number 
of working age individuals floods the job market, forcing many to enter the 
informal sector to survive.  As for the educationindex, the assumption that 
individuals avoided regulations and taxes because they could not comply with 
them due to illiteracy or lack of understanding may be completely wrong.  It is 
quite possible that it actually takes a higher skill level and understanding of the 
system to avoid laws and regulations than it does to comply with them.  Finally, 
the correlation between high government effectiveness and the informal economy 
is a little harder to explain.  It is possible that increases in government 
accountability lead to an influx of “start-up” informal businesses, as these 
business owners can be more secure in their ability to make a future profit when 
the government is following through on its promises.  The theorized effect that 
individuals would escape the restrictive formal sector as governments become less 
effective may be a variable that occurs on a larger time scale and is therefore not 
capture in this test.  It may take a jarring change in quality for a business to decide 
to leave for the informal sector.  Given the extremely low level of statistical 
significance for both the education index and government effectiveness in this 
test, it is also likely that there is not relationship between the two variables at all.  
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The remaining explanatory variables, GDP per capita (PPP) and female 
labor force participation measure, reflect the predicted relationships with 
informality.  As the literature suggests, an increase in gender equality is 
associated with a decrease in the amount of informal activity within a country, as 
women are able to enter formal businesses without facing the costs of breaking 
social norms (Mernissi, 1987). The labor force participation measure is an attempt 
to capture some measure of this inequality.  GDP per capita (PPP) and the 
informal economy are negatively related, supporting the hypothesis that low-
income individuals enter the informal sector out of necessity to survive, as a 
population with lower income is likely to have a larger informal econoy (Huq & 
Sultan, 1991; Neef, 2002).  As neither of these variables was much affected by the 
addition of the alternate tax burden measure, the relationship predicted by the first 
set of tests is not called into question.  Finally, as was previously discussed, the 
practical significance of the relationship between the informal economy and both 
GDP per capita (PPP) and female labor force participation rates is fairly 
substantial.      
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Methods & Results: Consequences 
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The following section delves into the second part of testing the rational 
legalist model – focusing on the differences between those informal businesses 
which are starting-up and those which are evading government oversight.  This 
section details the test which is set up to determine whether or not the hypothesis 
that these two types of informality have opposite effects on an economy’s growth 
is valid.  Following a description of the methods employed is an in-depth 
discussion of the results and their significance. 
Methods 
Though the previous section was designed to determine the relevant 
determinants of informality, there are several intervening factors which must be 
considered in identifying the true causes of informality for the following tests.  
While the details of this are thoroughly discussed in the previous section, it is 
important to note that several variables found to be insignificant are likely to be 
significant after considering possible complicating factors, such as lack of lagged 
variables in the regressions.  For the purpose of this section, significant 
determinants of the informal economy are: gender equality, age distribution of a 
population, tax burden, corruption, regulations, government quality, and 
poverty.39  
                                                 
39
 While many of these variables were found insignificant in the previous section, there is a large 
base of literature which supports the theorized relationship.  Regulations, tax burden, and 
corruption were the only variables kept despite their apparent insignificance. 
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After the relevant determinants of informality have been identified, the 
second step in testing rational legalist theory is to determine whether or not the 
effects of a conducive or restrictive business environment actually affect a 
country’s growth as theorized.  As previously stated, this theory predicts that the 
size of a country’s informal economy will be positively correlated with growth 
when a conducive environment exists and negatively correlated when a restrictive 
environment dominates.  In order to test this theory, an index composed of those 
explanatory variables found to be significant is created.40  This index is then used 
to divide countries into two groups, nations with an environment conducive to 
                                                 
40
 As information for more countries is available for the 2005 set of data, this set of tests is 
conducted with 2005 data.  See Appendix B.4 for the list of countries used for this section and 
their classifications. 
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Figure 5.1: Indexing the Explanatory Variables 
Step One: Index the Individual Variables* 
 
Indexed Value = [actual value – minimum value] 
                         [maximum value-minimum value] 
 
 
Step Two: Creating the Business Environment Index 
 
Country Score = [Female Labor Force Participation Index + Regulatory Quality 
Index + Fiscal Freedom Index + Dependency Ratios Index +Control of Corruption 
Index + Government Effectiveness Index + GDP per capita (PPP) Index] / [7]   
* This is the same general equation used to calculate the Human Development Index. 
formal businesses and those in which the environment is inadvertently restrictive 
to formality.  Each variable determined to be significant, regardless of the 
correlation coefficient, is indexed individually using Step One in Figure 5.1.  This 
ensures that each variable is measured on a scale of zero to one, removing the 
problems created by using measures scaled differently.  The equation used to 
index the variables is the same equation used by the United Nations in the initial 
steps of creating the Human Development Index (Human Development Reports, 
2007).  After each variable has been individually indexed, country scores are 
created by adding up the indexed values of each explanatory variable and dividing 
by seven, the total number of explanatory variables included.  Finally, countries 
are divided into two categories – those with conducive business environments and 
those with restrictive business environments – based on the results of this index.  
Gardner 85 
All countries scoring 0.50 or above were labeled conducive while those with 
scores below 0.50 are classified as restrictive.  After this division is complete, the 
correlation between growth and the informal economy is examined to test the 
hypothesis.  These statistics are looked at for the entire dataset as well as the 
differences in results between the restrictive and conducive groups to gain a better 
understanding of the changes brought about by separating the data.  In this second 
set of testing, it is important to understand that the informal economy is now the 
explanatory variable while growth is the dependent variable.   
Results 
While the correlation between growth and the size of a country’s informal 
economy is not exactly as predicted, the information this test produces suggest 
that the theorized effect does play into the relationship on some level.  The 
correlation between growth and informality is positive, but weak, when data from 
all countries, regardless of score on the environment index, are tested together.  
After countries are broken into their respective groups, both sets have positive 
correlations between growth and the size of the informal economy, though this 
relationship is much stronger in countries with good business environments.  The 
relationship is practically non-existent in countries classified as having restrictive 
environments.  The results of these tests are presented in greater detail below, 
along with scatter plots which display the relationship visually.      
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Before looking into the relationship between growth and the informal 
economy among the defined groups, it is important to understand the interaction 
between the two variables on a larger scale, testing all one hundred and twenty 
four countries in the sample together regardless of their business environment 
score.  This manner of testing found that the correlation between informality and 
growth is a weak 0.24.  This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 5.2.  As seen 
below, the relationship between growth and informality appears to be non-existent 
given the correlation when considering all countries together.  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Correlation of Growth and Informal Economy, All 
Countries 
124 Countries                                                           Source: See Figure A.1 
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Figure 5.3: Correlation of Growth and Informal Economy,  
Restrictive Countries 
88 Countries                                                           Source: See Figure A.1 
 
 
 
The next case to consider is that of countries with a restrictive business 
environment.  According to the index discussed above, the majority of countries 
fall into this category.  Eighty eight countries, listed in Figure B.4, are determined 
to have restrictive business environments.  With a correlation coefficient of 0.06, 
these countries have an even weaker relationship between growth and informally 
than the set of pooled countries.  While the correlation is positive, the relationship 
is so weak that this is not very important.  As seen in Figure 5.3, this relationship 
is obviously insignificant.  
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Figure 5.3: Correlation of Growth and Informal Economy,  
Conducive Countries 
36 Countries                                                     Source: See Figure A.1 
 
 Finally, the relationship between growth and informality in those countries 
with a conducive business environment is tested.  Though there are a smaller 
number of countries included in this group, only thirty six, it is important not to 
lower the bar of a 0.50 rating to be classified as a conducive merely to make the 
two groups more balanced.  This relationship is both strong and positive, with a 
correlation of 0.62, exactly as predicted by the theory.  As shown in Figure 5.4, 
the strength of this correlation is visually obvious, in strong contrast with the 
results both previous tests. 
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Further Discussion 
 The results of these tests support the hypothesis that there are two types of 
informality which effect growth in different ways.41  As previously discussed, the 
informal economy encompasses a variety of activities so the idea that this sector 
is comprised of a variety of activities which have varied effects on a country’s 
development is not a new one (Williams & Round, 2007).  Though the 
correlations are not exactly what rational legalist theory predicts, with the only 
significant correlation between growth and informality existing between those 
countries with a conducive business environment, this alone is noteworthy.  The 
relationship itself is very strong, especially in comparison with the extremely 
weak correlation among the variables when testing countries with a restrictive 
business environment or even among all countries in the group.  While the theory 
predicted that businesses evading the costs of formality would decrease growth 
within the country, it is possible that these businesses do not affect growth at all.  
As many of them may have been contributing very little to the GDP before 
leaving the formal economy, the existence of businesses evading formality 
appears to an unimportant factor to the country’s economic growth.   
 However, the data also suggests that those businesses entering the 
informal economy with plans to eventually formalize are important to the growth 
                                                 
41
 While the results of this test are encouraging, it is important not to overstate their meaning.  The 
use of simple correlation coefficients means the results are not as strong as those presented in the 
previous chapter as correlation coefficients do not control for extraneous variables which may also 
affect the relationship. 
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of a country’s GDP.  The significant shift of correlation strength when looking at 
only those businesses with conducive environments suggests that this relationship 
is more than just chance.  This finding will come as no surprise to the researchers 
in the field who have long been advocating that governments should shift their 
focus from punishing those in the informal economy to reworking the incentive 
structure so that these businesses will move to the formal economy on their own 
(Williams, 2005; Williams, 2006; Williams & Round, 2007).   
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Part VI 
 Conclusion: Final Thoughts 
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 After an extensive review of the literature and thorough testing, it appears 
as though the data does not support its theoretical backing.  However, this is not 
the case.  What the data does point to is the need for inclusion of variables beyond 
those traditionally discussed by legalist theorists in future models of informality.  
Rational legalist theory is correct in calling for this addition, even though the 
correlations were, in some cases, not predicted by the theory.  Given these 
outcomes, there are obviously several directions that future research could take.  
This final section of the study will briefly review the results of performed tests in 
the context of what was predicted and make suggestions for future research.  The 
practical importance of these results is also addressed. 
 Rational legalist theory has two different branches, the first of which deals 
with determining the causes of informality.  Using this framework, several 
explanatory variables not used in research based on legalist theory alone are 
introduced in this study, such as gender equality, exports, age distribution, and 
education.  The regressions performed indicate that both female labor force 
participation and a country’s dependency ratios play significant roles in the size of 
its informal sector.  Female labor force participation is negatively correlated with 
informality, indicating that increased inequity leads to an increase in informal 
activity, as predicted.  Surprisingly, a population with a large dependency ratio 
(more dependents than individuals of working age) is found to have less informal 
activity than those nations with more individuals of working age.  This contradicts 
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the hypothesis that large numbers of dependents would find refuge in the informal 
sector in order to help support their families.  The education index and 
government effectiveness measure were found to have borderline statistical 
significance, with relationships opposite those predicted.  This could be the result 
of several factors.  First of all, this set of tests focused on those variables 
predicted to cause evasive informal activity as it is this type of informality which 
is expected to harm a country’s development.  If a given variable has opposite 
effects on each type of informal activity, this could lead to biased results.   
Finally, exports are found to be insignificant.  These findings are an important 
step in supporting rational legalist theory – they back up the hypothesis that 
individuals take multiple factors into account, not simply burdens placed upon 
them by the state, when determining whether to formalize or enter the informal 
sector.   
 The surprising results of these tests suggest that the measures that 
quantified corruption, taxes, and the regulatory system are unrelated to the 
individual’s choice to enter informality.  As previously discussed in greater detail, 
this directly contradicts a large base of previous literature, suggesting that 
additional factors are at work.  There are several possible explanations for this 
discrepancy, from lack of variation in the observations to the short time over 
which changes are observed.  This study does not attempt to imply that these 
traditional explanations of informality are no longer important but merely to 
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assert that there are other factors that are just as, if not more, significant than these 
traditional explanations.   
 The second part of rational legalist theory draws on the legalist 
assumptions of the informal economy, suggesting that under different 
circumstances informality can affect growth in different ways.  The results in this 
section, while not entirely as predicted, suggest that countries with a conducive 
business environment have informal economies which tend to be supportive of 
growth.  While countries with restrictive environments do not have the negative 
relationship between informality and growth predicted, the relationship is not 
significantly positive either.  This suggests that, though the theory is not perfect, it 
does capture an important aspect of the informal economy – there are different 
types of informality which affect a country’s development in different ways.   
Using the example from the introduction, the Peruvian tailor who left the informal 
economy would be doing very little to harm her country’s growth, though the 
second tailor who entered the formal sector after building a clientele in the 
informal sector would be a true asset to helping the economy’s growth.  
 Given these findings, it seems that a further refinement of rational legalist 
theory is necessary for future studies.  The first part of the theory remains intact – 
the data backs up the hypothesis that individuals take into account a variety of 
factors before entering the formal sector.  That said, once the information is 
available, tests of these relationships over a longer period of time will be essential 
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to provide further support.  This detailed data will also be vital in testing the 
relationship of the traditionally legalist explanations of informality, such as tax 
burdens and regulations.  It is the second part of rational legalist theory that 
requires a small alteration.  This section of the theory rests on the assumption that 
businesses evading formality negatively effect a country’s growth.  But given the 
results above, it seems that businesses evading formality have little to no effect on 
growth at all.  That said, this type of informality still comes at the high cost of 
lowered tax revenue, distorted national statistics, and other issues discussed in 
detail within the theory chapter (Bajada & Schneider, 2005a).  A revised rational 
legalist theory would predict that countries with conducive business environments 
will find that the informal sector provides an engine for growth while those with 
restrictive environments will not be able to realize these benefits.  Future studies 
should also examine the differences among these types of informal business.  Are 
the benefits provided by start up businesses negated by the costs?  Do businesses 
evading detection affect a country’s development in other ways?  Perhaps the 
most effective way to answer these questions would be to conduct case studies 
focused on countries with highly varied business environments in order to tease 
out the more nuanced effects.  Though these are all interesting questions that must 
be considered in order to recommend sound policies directed at informal activity, 
they are beyond the scope of this paper.  
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 The findings of this study have implications for future policy in 
developing and developed countries alike.  Since most of the countries classified 
as having a restrictive environment are located in the developing world, these 
results confirm what has long been understood by researchers of development: 
economic growth requires more than simply changing the laws within a country.  
These changes must be accompanied by other, less tangible, improvements in 
order to have substantive effects.  The same is true in discussions of informality.  
In order to enhance the start-up sector within the informal economy, a country 
must accomplish more than mere reductions in its tax burden – improvements in 
gender equality are also important to the process.  As for countries with conducive 
business environments, these results suggest that punishing informal businesses 
may not be the most effective growth strategy.  As informality seems to serve as a 
kind of business incubator, these countries might be better served concentrating 
on easing the process of formalization.     
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Appendix A: Describing the Data 
 
 
 
 
Variable Indicator Source 
Informal Economy Size of Informal Economy  Schneider, 2007 
   ( as % of GDP)   
Gender Equality Labor Force Participation  World Development Indicators  
    Rate, female   
Education* Education Index Human Development Reports - UN 
      
Corruption Control of Corruption World Governance Indicators 
      
Poverty* GDP per capita, PPP  World Development Indicators  
   (constant 2000 US$)   
Tax Rates Fiscal Freedom  Heritage Foundation 
      
Regulations Regulatory Quality World Governance Indicators 
      
Age Distribution*  Dependency Ratio World Development Indicators  
  
    
Government Quality Government Effectiveness World Governance Indicators 
      
Exports Total Merchandise Trade  World Trade Organization  
   (divided by GDP) (World Development Indicators)  
GDP Growth GDP per capita growth  World Development Indicators  
   (annual %)   
Tax Burden (test) Top Marginal Tax Rate Fraser Institute  
  (Gwartney, et. al. 2007) 
Regulations (test) Business Freedom Heritage Foundation 
   
Corruption (test) Freedom from Corruption Heritage Foundation 
 
  
Figure A.1 Data Sources 
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Variable Min Max Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
# of   
Obs. 
Informal Economy 7.90 67.30 33.95 14.01 248 
      
 
Female Labor Force 16.92 89.24 57.97 14.48 248 
 Participation      
Education Index 16.00 99.00 78.1 19.6 248 
      
 
Control of Corruption -1.47 2.41 0.02 1.02 248 
      
 
GDP per capita (PPP) 0.463 37.267 9.558 9.978 248 
      
 
Fiscal Freedom 30.51 99.90 70.38 14.47 248 
      
 
Regulatory Burden -2.36 2.03 0.10 0.90 248 
      
 
Dependency Ratios 30.00 112.00 63.7 18.7 248 
      
 
Government Effectiveness -1.53 2.28 0.08 0.97 248 
      
 
Exports 0.02 1.97 0.32 0.25 248 
      
Tax Burden (test) 0.00 10.00 5.69 2.46 178 
Top marginal tax rates      
Regulations (test) 40.00 100.00 63.95 12.79 248 
Business Freedom      
Corruption (test) 10.00 100.00 5.69 2.46 248 
Freedom from Corruption      
GDP Growth -5.30 26.40 5.18 3.52 124 
      
 
Figure A.2 Descriptive Statistics, Full Data Set   
* All variables include data from 2000 and 2005 except GDP growth (which is only 
2005 data).   
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Figure A.3 Descriptive Statistics, Differenced Data   
* Variables indicate the differenced data set, with the country’s observed value at 
2000 subtracted from the country’s observed value at 2005.   
 
 
 
Variable Min Max 
Mea
n 
Std.  
Deviation 
# of   
Obs. 
Informal Economy -3.90 5.70 0.67 1.87 124 
      
 
Female Labor Force -6.75 11.37 1.10 3.01 124 
 Participation      
Education Index -9.00 19.00 2.19 3.85 124 
      
 
Control of Corruption -0.75 0.39 -0.05 0.23 124 
      
 
GDP per capita (PPP) -0.662 5.445 1.152 1.258 124 
      
 
Fiscal Freedom -19.34 43.49 5.23 9.51 124 
      
 
Regulatory Burden -0.99 0.86 -0.05 0.30 124 
      
 
Dependency Ratios -16.00 4.00 -3.76 3.51 124 
      
 
Government 
Effectiveness -0.61 0.65 -0.03 0.26 
124 
      
 
Exports -0.26 0.48 0.03 0.10 124 
      
Tax Burden (test) -2.50 7.00 0.57 1.49 89 
Top marginal tax rates      
Regulations (test) -15.00 15.00 -1.21 7.31 124 
Business Freedom      
Corruption (test) -38.00 24.00 -0.19 9.66 124 
Freedom from Corruption      
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inf= size of the informal economy   
edu = education index 
gen = female labor force participation  
cor = control of corruption  
pov = GDP per capita (PPP) 
qual = government effectiveness  
reg = regulatory burden  
tax = fiscal freedom 
ex = exports  
age  =  dependency ratios 
 
Figure A.4: Correlation Coefficients for Figure 4.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 inf edu gen cor pov qual reg tax Ex age 
inf 1.00          
edu 0.16 1.00         
gen -0.21 -0.05 1.00        
cor -0.07 0.13 -0.05 1.00       
pov -0.45 -0.03 0.07 0.30 1.00      
qual -0.07 0.13 -0.08 0.54 0.39 1.00     
reg -0.19 0.14 -0.18 0.27 0.50 0.58 1.00    
tax -0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.28 1.00   
ex 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 1.00  
age -0.36 -0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.08 -0.15 0.03 1.00 
 Observations: 124 Countries                                           Source: See Figure A.1 
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qual = government effectiveness  
reg = regulatory burden  
tax = fiscal freedom 
ex = exports  
age  =  dependency ratios 
 
inf= size of the informal economy   
edu = education index  
gen = female labor force participation  
cor2 = freedom from corruption  
pov = GDP per capita (PPP)  
Figure A.5: Correlation Coefficients for Figure 4.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 inf edu gen cor2 pov Qual reg2 tax2 ex age 
Inf 1.00          
edu 0.16 1.00         
gen -0.17 -0.05 1.00        
cor2 -0.16 0.01 0.01 1.00       
pov -0.41 -0.14 -0.02 0.10 1.00      
qual -0.02 0.06 -0.15 0.22 0.45 1.00     
reg2 -0.01 0.01 -0.21 0.13 0.07 0.06 1.00    
Tax2 -0.10 0.14 -0.15 0.12 0.04 -0.17 0.06 1.00   
Ex 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.18 -0.04 1.00  
age -0.44 -0.17 -0.09 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.03 -0.17 -0.01 1.00 
Observations: 89 Countries                                       Source: See Figure A.1 
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Figure B.1: Countries in Main Data Set 
124 Observations 
Appendix B: Countries in the Data Set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Albania 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong, China 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordon 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Republic 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Figure B.2: Countries Dropped From Main Data Set 
21 Observations 
Angola Oman 
Bhutan Palau 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Papua New Guinea 
Burundi Puerto Rico 
Central African Republic Samoa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) Serbia Montenegro 
Kiribati Solomon Islands 
Macedonia Taiwan 
Maldives Tonga 
Marshall Islands Vanuatu 
Micronesia, Fed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The countries listed above are those observations which had to be dropped 
from the main data set because information was unavailable for one or more 
of the explanatory variables in both 2000 and 2005.  Fortunately, there are 
not many observations that had to be dropped initially, making the problem 
of inadvertent bias highly unlikely.   
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Figure B.3: Countries Dropped for Test Data Set 
35 Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The countries listed above are those which had to be dropped for the 
test data set due to the lack of data points in the information 
complied by the Fraser Institute.   The loss of so many countries 
from the data set appears to bias the data, as seen in the altered 
correlation coefficients in Figure A.4 as compared to those in A.3 
(from countries using the same measurement, just a different number 
of observations). 
Albania Lesotho 
Algeria Madagascar 
Syrian Arab Republic Mali 
Armenia Mauritania 
Azerbaijan Moldova 
Belarus Mongolia 
Benin Mozambique 
Burkina Faso Nepal 
Cambodia Niger 
Chad Rwanda 
Ethiopia Saudi Arabia 
Georgia Sierra Leone 
Guinea Togo 
Haiti Tunisia 
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan 
Kyrgyz Republic Vietnam 
Lao PDR Yemen 
Lebanon  
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Figure B.4: Classifications for Part V Results 
 
Restrictive Business Environment 
Albania Dominican Republic Lebanon Romania 
Algeria Ecuador Lesotho Russia 
Argentina Egypt Madagascar Rwanda 
Armenia El Salvador Malawi Saudi Arabia 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Malaysia Senegal 
Bangladesh Fiji Mali Sierra Leone 
Belarus Georgia Mauritania South Africa 
Benin Ghana Mexico Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Guatemala Moldova Syria 
Botswana Guinea Mongolia Tanzania 
Brazil Haiti Morocco Thailand 
Bulgaria Honduras Mozambique Togo 
Burkina Faso India Namibia Tunisia 
Cambodia Indonesia Nepal Turkey 
Cameroon Iran Nicaragua Uganda 
Chad Italy Niger Ukraine 
China Jamaica Nigeria Uzbekistan 
Colombia Jordon Pakistan Venezuela 
Congo, Rep. Kazakhstan Panama Vietnam 
Costa Rica Kenya Paraguay Yemen 
Cote d'Ivoire Kyrgyz Republic Peru Zambia 
Croatia Lao PDR Philippines Zimbabwe 
 
 
Australia France Kuwait Slovak Republic 
Austria Germany Latvia Slovenia 
Belgium Greece Lithuania Spain 
Canada Hong Kong, China Netherlands Sweden 
Chile Hungary New Zealand Switzerland 
Czech Republic Ireland Norway United Arab Emirates 
Denmark Israel Poland United Kingdom 
Estonia Japan Portugal United States 
Finland Korea, Republic Singapore Uruguay 
Conducive Business Environment 
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